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NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING IN THE SHADOW
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Laura A. Dickinson*
Abstract
Scholars have long debated whether and how international law
impacts governmental behavior, even in the absence of coercive sanction.
But this literature does not sufficiently address the possible impact of
international law in the area of national security policymaking. Yet,
policies that the executive branch purports to adopt as a wholly
discretionary matter may still be heavily influenced by international legal
norms, regardless of whether or not those norms are formally recognized
as legally binding. And those policies can be surprisingly resilient, even
in subsequent administrations. Moreover, because they are only seen as
discretionary policies, they may be more easily adopted than formal legal
interpretations. For all of these reasons, the impact of international law
on national security policymaking is a crucial unexplored area in the
debate about the efficacy of international law.
This Article describes how the norms and values embedded in
international human rights law can sometimes be adopted, if not as a
matter of formal law at the international level, then as a matter of official
policy and practice. In addition, it surveys the advantages and
disadvantages of such an approach, using two different Obama
administration counterterrorism policies and Trump administration
successor policies as case studies. Ultimately, I argue that the emergence
and persistence of such policies is evidence of international law’s
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constraining impact. International law, it turns out, casts a long shadow
as its paradigms get translated into policy. I also analyze the attributes of
these policies, including their “legalistic” character and the
consequences of creating policies of this type. This analysis suggests that
importing international law paradigms into national security
policymaking can be a pragmatic and effective alternative to formal
international lawmaking, though it also may side-step the process of
creating robust new international law rules. Therefore, it is a practice that
executive branch officials from the United States and other countries,
human rights organizations, and administrative, constitutional, and
international law scholars should at least consider, while weighing both
the pros and cons. In addition, the stickiness of such policymaking, even
across administrations, illustrates the importance of institutional path
dependence, the role of lawyers, the constraint of interoperability with key
U.S. allies in multilateral military actions, and the way norms get
embedded in government organizations.
INTRODUCTION
The Trump administration ushered in what appeared to be a new era of hostility
to international law in the United States. From the repudiation of the Paris Climate
accord1 to the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Agreement,2 the administration
seemed to cast off international legal frameworks at every turn.
Even against this backdrop, however, former President Trump’s dismissive
stance towards international legal norms in the national security domain stands out.
Trump campaigned on bringing back torture, bombing civilians, and “loading up”
Guantanamo Naval Base with more counterterrorism detainees. For example, Trump
1

Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris
Agreement, an international climate change convention, in June of 2017. Remarks
Announcing United States Withdrawal from the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 373 (June 1, 2017). The
Agreement itself does not permit states to indicate an intent to withdraw until three years
from the date the Agreement entered into force, Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), Art.
28.1, and U.S. withdrawal took effect on November 4, 2020. See Lisa Friedman, U.S. Quits
Paris Climate Agreement: Questions and Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/climate/paris-climate-agreement-trump.html [https://
perma.cc/N5VV-ZHKR]. President Biden announced his intent to rejoin the Agreement on
the first day of his Presidency, and the United States officially became a party to the
Agreement again on February 19, 2021. Press Statement, Anthony Blinken, U.S. Secretary,
The U.S. Officially Rejoins the Paris Agreement (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.state.gov/theunited-states-officially-rejoins-the-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/HJB5-B4LZ].
2
National Security Presidential Memorandum on Ceasing United States Participation
in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Taking Additional Action to Counter Iran’s
Malign Influence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 311 (May 8, 2018).
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said that “torture works” and promised to “immediately” reinstate waterboarding
and other forms of torture when he became President “because ‘we have to beat the
savages’ of the Islamic State.”3 Similarly, on the campaign trail, Trump vowed to
keep the wartime prison at Guantanamo Naval Base open, offered to “load it up with
some bad dudes,” and said he would support prosecuting U.S. citizens accused of
terrorism in the military commissions there.4 In an interview on Fox News in 2015,
then presidential candidate Trump explained that, to defeat ISIS, he would “take out
their families.”5 And toward the end of his Presidency, Trump suggested he might
target sites of Iranian cultural heritage in any conflict with Iran,6 and he pardoned
U.S. service members convicted of war crimes.7
The Trump administration’s apparent rejection of international law might seem
to provide evidence of international law’s fundamental irrelevance. So-called
international relations realists and others have long argued that international law has
little, if any, enforcement power, and that states follow international law only when
convenient. Therefore, according to these scholars, international law has no
independent constraining effect.8
3
James Risen & Sheri Fink, Trump Said ‘Torture Works.’ An Echo Is Feared
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/us/politics/
trump-torture-guantanamo.html [https://perma.cc/56DX-WK3H].
4
Charlie Savage, Donald Trump ‘Fine’ with Prosecuting U.S. Citizens at Guantanamo,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016, 5:18 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/us/politics/
donald-trump-american-citizens-guantanamo.html [https://perma.cc/Q62E-MY4Y].
5
Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: ‘Take Out Their Families,’ CNN (Dec.
3, 2015, updated 12:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trumpterrorists-families/index.html [https://perma.cc/V9N2-2ZAW].
6
Maggie Haberman, Trump Threatens Iranian Cultural Sites, and Warns of Sanctions
on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/us/
politics/trump-iran-cultural-sites.html [https://perma.cc/4ZCS-SR39].
7
Dave Philipps, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/trump-pardons.html
[https://perma.cc/44FJ-CV4Q].
8
See, e.g., EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919–1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 85–88 (2d ed. 1946) (rejecting
internationalism/cosmopolitanism and stating that the principles commonly invoked in
international politics were “unconscious reflexions [sic] of national policy based on a
particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time”); JACK L. GOLDSMITH &
ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26–28 (2005) (using game theory and
rational choice modeling in an effort to show that international law has no independent
value); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE 5 (5th ed. 1973) (noting that the “main signpost that helps political realism to find its
way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms
of power”); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 130 (1979) (arguing
that “although states may be disposed to react to international constraints and incentives,”
states also determine their actions and policies based on their internal interests); Robert H.
Bork, The Limits of “International Law,” 18 NAT’L INT. 3–9 (Winter 1989–1990)
(discussing the various limitations of international law); Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance
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Yet, at least in the national security context, some international legal norms
proved surprisingly durable even in the atmosphere of distrust and disdain for
international law that pervaded the Trump years.9 The Trump administration did not,
in fact, reinstate torture (as far as we know) or launch a campaign to attack civilians
in armed conflict. Nor did it bring a single new detainee to Guantanamo Naval Base.
Perhaps most unexpectedly, when conducting counterterrorism operations
abroad, the Trump administration was more deferential to international human rights
law (IHRL) norms than one might have anticipated. In particular, the Trump
administration continued to use elements of an Obama administration policy
framework for deploying lethal force against leaders of terrorist groups in parts of
Africa and other places that many countries do not recognize as war zones.10 Under
this framework, military personnel reportedly must ensure, for example, that there
is a “near certainty” civilians will not be killed during the operation.11 Such a rule
resembles the rules embedded in IHRL and goes far beyond what the generally more
permissive laws of war would require. Significantly, this framework that has been
so surprisingly resilient was not even adopted by the Obama administration as
legally binding requirements under international law.12 Instead, the rules were
embodied in a set of legalistic policies applicable to counterterrorism operations.
of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10
CAL W. INT’L L.J. 193, 200–01 (1980) (arguing that World War II made clear that states
cannot rely solely on international law to protect their interests).
9
For a more general argument about the resilience of international law in the Trump
administration, see generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018).
10
See WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS
(2018) [hereinafter 2018 FRAMEWORKS REPORT]. The White House provided the report
pursuant to Section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY)
2018 (Pub. L. No. 115-91), which was later amended by Section 1261 of the NDAA for FY
2020 (Pub. L. No. 11-92). The Trump administration provided another brief (and overdue)
update to this report on Oct. 20, 2020. WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED
NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS (2020).
11
See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on
Drone Strikes and Commando Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html [https://perma.cc/
UHJ3-Z8VG] [hereinafter Savage & Schmitt, Trump Poised]. The Trump policy, which was
made public shortly before this Article goes to press, also allowed more discretion for
decisionmakers to deviate from the standard “where necessary.” See Charlie Savage,
Trump’s Secret Rules for Drone Strikes Outside War Zones Are Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES (May,
1 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/politics/trump-drone-strike-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/C3V9-W7FZ] [hereinafter Savage, Trump’s Secret Rules].
12
See EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against
Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (May 22,
2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_
against_terrorist_targets/download [https://perma.cc/4HZ8-W54C] [hereinafter PPG].
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A growing scholarly literature, much of it empirical, responds to the
international relations realists and seeks to demonstrate the on-the-ground
constraining impact of international law, even in the absence of coercive sanctions.13
But this literature does not sufficiently address the possible impact of international
law in the area of national security policymaking. Yet, it turns out that policies that
the executive branch purports to adopt as a wholly discretionary matter may still be
heavily influenced by international legal norms, regardless of whether or not those
norms are formally recognized as legally binding. And those policies can be
surprisingly resilient, even in subsequent administrations. Moreover, because they
are only seen as discretionary policies, they may be more easily adopted than formal
legal interpretations. For all of these reasons, the impact of international law on
national security policymaking is a crucial, unexplored area in the debate about the
efficacy of international law. Furthermore, it is not only a debate with scholarly
significance but one that has tremendous practical relevance for government
officials and representatives of non-governmental organizations as well. Indeed,
national security officials in the U.S. administration of President Biden should be
considering these issues as they review and revise key national security policies.14
Among other things, these officials must decide whether to continue with the policy
approach or, alternatively, to adopt a narrower conception of armed conflict zones
and embrace broader, more robust interpretations of IHRL as a matter of law rather
than policy.
This Article describes how the norms and values embedded in international
human rights law can sometimes be adopted, if not as a matter of formal law at the
international level, then as a matter of official policy and practice. In addition, it
surveys the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach, using two different
Obama administration counterterrorism policies and their Trump administration
successor policies as case studies. Ultimately, I argue that the emergence and
persistence of such policies is evidence of international law’s constraining impact.
13

For examples of scholarly literature advancing this argument, see generally RYAN
GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009); Courtenay R. Conrad & Emily
Hencken Ritter, Treaties, Tenure and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of
International Law, 75 J. POL. 397 (2013); Daniel W. Hill, Jr., Estimating the Effects of
Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. POL 1161 (2010); Yonatan Lupu, Best
Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International
Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT’L ORG. 469 (2013); Yonatan Lupu, Legislative Veto
Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements, 59 AM J. POL. SCI. 578
(2015). But see Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner: Treaties and Human Rights: The Role of
Long-Term Trends, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2018); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935 (2002).
14
See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Biden Secretly Limits Counterterrorism
Drone Strikes Away from War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/us/politics/biden-drones.html [https://perma.cc/L7Q9
-SHGR] (noting that Biden officials are reviewing whether to revise targeting policies)
[hereinafter Savage & Schmitt, Biden Secretly Limits].
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International law, it turns out, casts a long shadow as its paradigms get translated
into policy. I also analyze the attributes of these policies, including their “legalistic”
character and the consequences of creating policies of this type. This analysis
suggests that national security policymaking can be a pragmatic and effective way
of implementing international legal paradigms even in the absence of formal
international lawmaking,15 though it also may side-step the process of creating
robust new international law rules. Therefore, it is a practice that executive branch
officials from the United States and other countries, human rights organizations, and
administrative, constitutional, and international law scholars should at least
consider, while weighing both the pros and cons. In addition, the stickiness of such
policymaking, even across administrations, illustrates the importance of institutional
path dependence, the role of lawyers, the constraint of interoperability with key U.S.
allies in multilateral military actions, and the way norms get embedded in
government organizations.
Part I of this Article provides the necessary background for evaluating the
efficacy of the Obama administration’s policy approach. It describes the
fundamental conflict between the United States and many of its allies over the
appropriate international legal paradigm or paradigms that should govern
extraterritorial counterterrorism operations, such as those involving the use of lethal
force or military detention. These counterterrorism operations have, in the years
since the September 2001 attacks on the United States, stretched the boundaries of
armed conflict both geographically and temporally.16 The question, therefore, arises:
should government lawyers assess such operations under a war paradigm, governed
by international humanitarian law (IHL), sometimes called the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC)? Or, by contrast, should they evaluate these counterterrorism
operations abroad as law enforcement operations, which would generally be
governed under the more restrictive regime of IHRL? Further complicating matters
is whether the doctrine of national self-defense that is part of the jus ad bellum (the
body of law regulating the resort to force by one state in the territory of another)
should provide the primary basis for the legal analysis. Or does some combination
of these domains of international law form the governing legal framework?
The question of the appropriate legal paradigm is not merely of technical,
academic interest to lawyers toiling away at their desks in the bowels of the
Pentagon, the State Department, and other government buildings. Rather, it has
profound consequences for any proposed military operations to detain or kill
15

To be sure, due to the secrecy surrounding implementation of such policies, executive
branch officials may interpret them in self serving ways even as they borrow international
legal categories to confer legitimacy on their actions. See Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes
in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1569 (2016).
16
See generally ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY
BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016) (explaining how the military
now influences many dimensions of public policy); CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE
RELENTLESS RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND SECRECY (2015) [hereinafter SAVAGE,
POWER WARS] (exploring how executive authority and secrecy developed in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries).
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terrorist targets abroad. For example, with respect to the use of lethal force, under a
war paradigm, targeted killing of an enemy is lawful unless it runs afoul of broad
principles such as distinction (civilians and civilian objects must not be attacked)
and proportionality (the expected military advantage of the action must exceed the
expected harm to civilians and civilian objects).17 But in peacetime, when IHRL
generally governs, individuals cannot be killed at all, except in much more limited
circumstances, such as when the killing is absolutely necessary to defend oneself or
others.18
Significantly, the Obama administration—like the Bush administration before
it—took the position that, as a purely legal matter, IHL/LOAC rather than IHRL
applies globally to U.S. counterterrorism operations, at least as to certain terrorist
organizations, such as Al Qaeda.19 Even outside zones widely recognized as
embroiled in armed conflict, the United States has maintained that, with respect to
certain hostile groups, a war is taking place.20 Accordingly, the law of war should
govern. The Trump administration continued to embrace this view. This
interpretation of international law, however, contrasts with the interpretation of
many U.S. allies, who have maintained that IHL/LOAC does not necessarily apply
globally to operations against terrorists such as Al Qaeda, instead adopting a more
fact-specific analysis of whether an armed conflict is occurring in the particular
geographic location where operations are contemplated. If an armed conflict is not
occurring, according to their analysis, the generally higher standards of IHRL
applicable to the use of force and detention would often govern.21 In addition, allies
who view armed conflict zones more narrowly would apply the jus ad bellum in the
targeting context and would take a more stringent approach to some of these ad
bellum elements than the United States does.
This conflict in the legal approach is potentially quite significant. Many
countries that adopt a more confined view of IHL/LOAC, such as the UK, France,
Germany, and Canada, partner regularly with the United States in counterterrorism
operations across the globe. Thus, different views regarding the applicable legal
regime create numerous so-called “interoperability”22 challenges that could make it
more difficult for these allies to co-operate with the United States.
17

See infra notes 90–118 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57–89 and accompanying text.
19
See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING
THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY
OPERATIONS 11, 19 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT]; see also 2018
FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 4–7.
20
See, e.g., 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 18 (identifying military
operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as an ongoing armed conflict).
21
See generally KENNETH WATKIN, FIGHTING AT THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES:
CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT (2016) (explaining the
difficulties that states now face in using military force during modern conflicts).
22
“Interoperability” is not a term that appears within IHL/LOAC, but the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) defines the term as “the ability to act together coherently,
18
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Enter what I am calling “legalistic” national security policies. In the face of
these conflicting interpretations of applicable international law, the United States
has crafted a number of national security policies that have imposed rules and
standards that are more restrictive than the legal minimum, but they have done so as
a matter of policy rather than as an interpretation of international law requirements.
These policies, although they are merely policies at the international level, are often
quite legalistic. They are written in a way that requires legal analysis and legalistic
judgments because they impose rules and standards that must be interpreted. Indeed,
many of them impose legal obligations as a matter of domestic law. Yet, because
they are framed as policies, they allow the U.S. Government to formally retain its
interpretation of the scope of IHL/LOAC and largely reject IHRL’s applicability
even as it adopts IHRL standards as a matter of practice.
Part II describes two sets of these “legalistic” national security policies adopted
by the Obama administration and continued to some degree during the Trump
administration, one addressing operational rules for targeted killings of suspected
terrorists abroad,23 and the other pertaining to the procedures required to justify
continued U.S. detention of suspected terrorists.24 Each of these policies includes
norms and procedures that bring U.S. practice closer to the norms of IHRL, even as
the United States has never accepted the applicability of IHRL to the
counterterrorism operations that these policies govern.25 And both have been
surprisingly durable. Implemented during the Obama administration, each policy
faced harsh political criticism by candidate Trump on the campaign trail. Yet,
despite rolling back some aspects of these policies, the Trump administration
preserved elements of each.26
The first such policy provides standards for the use of lethal force outside zones
that are universally recognized as sites of armed conflict. Known initially as the
Presidential Policy Guidance on Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against
effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”
Interoperability, Official NATO Terminology Database, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/Web.
mvc [https://perma.cc/URE7-FUV2] (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). As one commentator
noted, “Interoperability is necessary to ensure a coalition can function with unity of effort
and unity of purpose . . . . It is indispensable to the implementation of a comprehensive
approach to armed conflict operations.” Blaise Cathcart, Coalition Warfare and the Law of
Armed Conflict in 2040, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT 2040 (Mike Schmitt & Matt
Waxman eds., forthcoming 2021).
23
See PPG, supra note 12.
24
Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 10, 2011) (entitled “Periodic
Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to Authorization
to Use Military Force”). Some of these policies have now been incorporated into domestic
law. Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1023, 125 Stat. 1564–65 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2012)).
25
See 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that the U.S. follows
the law of armed conflict and respects state sovereignty when it conducts extraterritorial
military operations but does not mention international human rights law).
26
With respect to targeting, see Savage & Schmitt, Trump Poised, supra note 11. With
respect to Guantanamo detainees, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,823, 83 Fed. Reg. 4831 (Jan.
30, 2018) (entitled “Protecting America Through Lawful Detention of Terrorists”).
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Terrorist Targets Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (PPG),27
this policy sets standards and procedures for the use of lethal force against terrorist
targets. The policy includes both substantive standards and criteria for each proposed
action, as well as procedural rules such as mandates about the level of review by
senior governmental officials. Significantly, these standards and procedures exceed
the requirements of IHL/LOAC. Reportedly, the Trump administration continued
this policy to a degree, retaining some, but not all, of its elements.28
A second set of legalistic policies concerns the military detention of terrorism
suspects outside the United States. One such policy, the rules for periodic review
boards (PRBs) at Guantanamo Naval Station established during the Obama
administration,29 sets forth standards and procedures for evaluating the continued
detention of terrorism suspects held there. Like the PPG, these rules contain both
substantive standards, such as whether the detainee presents a continuing threat, as
well as procedural requirements for certain government personnel to participate in
the review. The Trump administration retained these rules30 (some of which have
been codified).31 Some commentators have maintained that such rules are mandated
by IHRL, IHL/LOAC, or some combination of the two bodies of law.32 The United
States, however, has never accepted that these rules are legally required under
international law but has adopted them as a matter of policy.33 And the United States
developed other, similar policies for detainees held by the U.S. military outside the
United States at locations other than Guantanamo Bay.34
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of this “legalistic policy” path. By
adopting these policies, the United States did not formally agree to be bound by
IHRL in conducting extraterritorial counterterrorism operations.35 Yet, these
policies implement human rights values to some degree. Arising in an inter27

PPG, supra note 12.
See, e.g., 2018 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 (explaining the Trump
administration’s decision to “continue[], as a matter of policy, to apply heightened targeting
standards that are more protective of civilians than are required under the law of armed
conflict.”). See also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
29
Exec. Order No. 13,567, supra note 24.
30
Exec. Order No. 13,823, supra note 26.
31
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1023, 125 Stat. 1298, 1564–65 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2012)).
32
See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N ON H.R., TOWARDS THE CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO
39–49 (2015).
33
See, e.g., id. at 45; 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 30–32.
34
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.01E, § 3(i) (Aug. 19, 2014)
(describing a periodic review policy for the detention of all individuals in DoD custody or
control). For a detailed account of these policies and procedures, in comparison to those
adopted by the United Kingdom, see Laura A. Dickinson, Administrative Law Values and
National Security Functions: Military Detention in the United States and the United
Kingdom, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 635 (Peter Cane,
Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Eric C. Ip & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2020) [hereinafter Dickinson,
Administrative Law Values].
35
See, e.g., 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 24–26, 30–31.
28
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governmental setting in which key U.S. allies follow IHRL, interoperability benefits
appear to have pushed the United States in a more human rights-oriented direction
that has persisted across administrations to a surprising degree. International human
rights law, it seems, casts a long shadow, even in situations where governments are
articulating discretionary policies rather than formally binding legal interpretations.
Part III also examines the possible advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a
policy path. To some human rights advocates, the Obama administration missed an
opportunity to formally roll back the war paradigm and articulate a stronger role for
IHRL as it applies to extraterritorial counterterrorism operations.36 And, to be sure,
the costs of this approach are significant. On the other hand, the policy approach
helped, as a practical matter, to move the United States towards greater alignment
with human rights norms than might have otherwise been the case. Specifically,
these policies helped mitigate the interoperability challenges involved when
collaborating with allies on counterterrorism operations, smoothed over interagency disputes about the proper scope of IHRL in this area, and, as a procedural
matter, preserved legalistic judgments (and a corresponding role for lawyers) even
as formally these judgments remained outside the realm of IHRL. Finally, as
mentioned at the outset, these policies have been surprisingly durable. Policy is, in
theory, more variable from administration to administration. Yet, despite rolling
back some aspects of these policies, the Trump administration, perhaps remarkably,
preserved some core elements of each.37 As the Biden administration reviews these
policies, in addition to debating their substantive elements, administration officials
should carefully and explicitly consider the costs and benefits of a policy approach
as compared to one that is more grounded in IHRL itself.
Thus, this Article explores how national security policymaking plays a hitherto
unrecognized role both in effectuating international law norms even in the absence
of formal law and in advancing those norms in the face of conflicting interpretations
about their content. In a rapidly changing domain of international affairs, such
legalistic policies can serve an important bridging function that can further
multilateral operations while preserving commitments to fundamental rule of law
values. In addition, such policies can help address internal differences within
governments as well. At a minimum, the phenomenon of such legalistic policies,
drafted to navigate among international law paradigms, is worthy of ongoing study
and discussion.
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See, e.g., Obama Administration Discloses Previously Classified Procedures for
Authorizing Force Outside Areas of “Active Hostilities,” HUM RTS. FIRST (Aug. 7, 2016)
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/obama-administration-discloses-previouslyclassified-procedures-authorizing-force [https://perma.cc/TEE9-ZFJC] (referring to the PPG
and noting that “[t]he President should formalize safeguards that would bring our country’s
use of force into compliance with international law, including by clearly differentiating
between the rules that apply to the use of force in war and the rules that govern the use of
lethal force in all other circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted).
37
See, e.g., 2018 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.

2021]

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING

639

I. WAR OR NOT-WAR?: INTERNATIONAL LAW PARADIGMS APPLICABLE
TO EXTRATERRITORIAL COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
In order to see the significance of national security policymaking in the area of
counterterrorism activities, it is necessary to understand the crucial debate that has
raged for two decades about which international legal regime should apply to such
operations. Military operations against terrorists globally since the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States raise complex questions about the scope of
applicable legal paradigms and have stretched the boundaries of those paradigms. In
this new context, the contemporary battlefield arguably has changed, and the rise of
non-state actors such as terrorist groups, the growing use of military and security
contractors, the development of new military and security technologies such as
unmanned aerial vehicles (more commonly known as “drones”), and the emergence
of weapons systems with autonomous capabilities have all put enormous pressure
on existing law.38
States developed IHL/LOAC when war largely consisted of contests between
and among large, hierarchical, organized militaries.39 The foundational treaties
defining a significant portion of this body of law, the Geneva Conventions, reflect
this context: among the hundreds of provisions in these treaties, only one is devoted
to conflicts involving non-state actors.40 Although subsequent treaties attempted to
address wars with non-state groups such as guerilla movements or insurgents (and
IHL/LOAC imposes obligations on all actors within an armed conflict),41 even these
efforts did not really contemplate the prospect of transnational conflicts with nonstate actors crossing the boundaries of multiple states. The emergence of new
military technologies has also raised questions about whether existing law is
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See, e.g., LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2–3 (2011) [hereinafter
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE]; Laura A. Dickinson, Drones, Automated
Weapons, and Private Military Contractors: Challenges to Domestic and International
Legal Regimes Governing Armed Conflict, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND PRACTICE 93–96 (Molly K. Land & Jay D. Aronson eds., 2018) [hereinafter Dickinson,
Drones].
39
See DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 38, at 40–68.
40
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6
U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6
U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
41
See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art.
1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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adequate to regulate the challenges of warfare as it is currently practiced or might
be practiced in the future.42
Other relevant bodies of international law, including IHRL43 and the jus ad
bellum,44 the law that governs the resort to force in the territory of another state, also
largely contemplated the regulation of state actors (as opposed to non-state entities).
For example, IHRL does not directly bind non-state entities.45 And, at the time of
the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, it was contested whether non-state actors
could even commit an armed attack that would trigger a state’s right of self-defense
under the jus ad bellum.46 Furthermore, these bodies of law were formed long before
technologies such as drones, autonomous capabilities, and cyber-attacks existed.
Because of these fundamental changes, it is often extremely difficult to
determine which international legal regime (or regimes) should govern
extraterritorial operations against terrorists beyond traditional battlefields such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. One approach is to treat such terrorists largely as
criminals and deploy a law enforcement model for tracking, capturing, prosecuting,
and—in certain very limited circumstances—killing them.47 Within this model, the
framework of IHRL would generally apply. In contrast, if terrorists are viewed as
fighting a global war, then the battlefield itself is potentially global, and the largely
less-restrictive IHL/LOAC regime would apply. Or, if targeting terrorism suspects
is seen as an act of national self-defense, then the law regarding the resort to force
in national self-defense under the jus ad bellum might govern. Moreover, these legal
regimes are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and not surprisingly, states and
commentators have taken different positions regarding when, where, and under what
circumstances IHRL, IHL/LOAC, and self-defense regimes should apply and how
they overlap.48
These differences matter. The question of which legal regime (or combination)
governs has consequences for decisions related to (1) whether to capture or kill a
terrorism suspect; (2) the rules applicable to targeted killings; (3) the level of
acceptable civilian casualties; (4) how detention may be carried out; (5) the
appropriate procedures and personnel to conduct operations; and (6) whether, and
what type of, investigations are required in the face of allegations of misconduct.

42

See Dickinson, Drones, supra note 38, at 93–94, 102–12.
See DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 38, at 40–68.
44
See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012).
45
See DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 38, at 10–11.
46
See Deeks, supra note 44.
47
See, e.g., WATKIN, supra note 21, at 287–300; Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith,
Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1079, 1087–88 (2008).
48
WATKIN, supra note 21, at 287–322; Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of
War in the War on Terrorism, 22 MINN. J. L. & INEQUALITY 195, 198–203 (2004).
43
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For example, consider the U.S. operation that killed Al Qaeda leader and U.S.
citizen Anwar Al-Awlaki in a 2011 drone strike in Yemen.49 The operation sparked
a heated debate in the United States and elsewhere about the possible legal basis for
the strike.50 In addition to significant questions about whether the U.S. Constitution
permitted such lethal action against a U.S. citizen overseas, lawyers and
policymakers disagreed about whether the action violated international law.51
Central to that disagreement was a difference of views about whether the specific
location where Al-Awlaki was killed should be considered the site of an ongoing
armed conflict.52 If so, then IHL/LOAC would govern, and if not then the more
stringent protections of IHRL would likely apply, along with the jus ad bellum.
Indeed, journalistic accounts suggest that even within the U.S. government itself,
lawyers and policymakers clashed over this question.53
Although the United States did not initially provide the legal basis for the AlAwlaki strike,54 the government has since clarified that it sees itself in a global war
against Al Qaeda and ISIS and therefore views the battlefield as potentially
worldwide for purposes of international law.55 Moreover, the United States position
applies not only to targeted killings such as the Al-Awlaki strike but other
extraterritorial counterterrorism operations such as detention. And in both contexts,
the U.S. position differs fundamentally from that of many U.S. allies, who have
adopted a more confined view of the scope of IHL/LOAC and a broader role for
IHRL.
This conflict in the legal approach is potentially quite significant. It could
dictate different outcomes for a particular operation, with IHL/LOAC permitting
actions that IHRL would restrict. Thus, for countries that adopt a more confined
view of IHL/LOAC and that partner regularly with the United States in
counterterrorism operations across the globe, the difference in views could present
49

See Mark Mazetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert Worth, Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing
of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/
world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/MJ4Q-5ZX7].
50
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret US Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-usmemo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html [https://perma.cc/WTE6-7KYJ] [hereinafter
Savage, Secret US Memo].
51
See, e.g., Michael Ramsden, Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law:
The Case of Anwar Al-Awlaki, J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 385 (2011).
52
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Court Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving Killing
American in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/
justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-target-anwar-al-awlaki.html [https://perma.cc/K67X6XKQ].
53
See id.; see also Savage, Secret US Memo, supra note 50.
54
The United States subsequently released a memo providing the legal reasoning that
supported the strike. Memorandum for Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Re:
Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal
Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010) https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
olc/aulaqi.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U8L-87T7].
55
2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 11, 19.
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significant “interoperability”56 challenges that could make it more difficult for these
allies to co-operate with the United States. It could, for example, affect intelligencesharing, the use of military bases to launch airstrikes, and other aspects of military
operations.
This Part describes in more detail first the IHRL model and then the IHL/LOAC
model for engaging in counterterrorism operations. The discussion makes clear the
important differences in what these two models permit and, therefore, the stakes in
the interpretive battle over which paradigm applies. Because the jus ad bellum
framework is also relevant to extraterritorial counterterrorism operations, and the
United States differs from some allies in its interpretation of this body of law as well,
this Part also briefly describes its foundational principles. This Part then describes
the differences between the U.S. view and that of key allies, focusing on two of its
critical counterterrorism partners: The United Kingdom and Germany.
A. The Strict Law-Enforcement/International Human Rights Law Paradigm
International human rights law generally dictates a strict law-enforcement
approach to extraterritorial terrorism operations outside of traditional battlefields.
Thus, IHRL would generally govern crucial decisions about the tracking, capturing,
and disposition of terrorist targets outside a country’s territory and outside armed
conflict zones. In many circumstances, this legal regime is more restrictive than the
legal rules imposed by the alternative IHL/LOAC paradigm.57

56
See Cathcart, supra note 22; see also Kirby Abbott, A Brief Overview of Legal
Interoperability Challenges for NATO Arising from the Interrelationship Between IHL and
IHRL in Light of the European Convention on Human Rights, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 107,
108 (2014) (“Should NATO Member States eventually diverge on whether the use of force
frameworks are to be defined primarily by a law enforcement paradigm . . . or by a warfighting paradigm . . . it would be difficult to say that NATO would be legally interoperable
in any meaningful sense.”); Steven Hill, The Role of NATO’s Legal Adviser, in THE ROLE OF
LEGAL ADVISERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (Andraz Zidar & Jean-Pierre Gauci, eds.
2016); Steven Hill & David Lematayer, Legal Issues of Multinational Military Operations:
An Alliance Perspective, 55 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 13, 14 (2016) (“[L]egal interoperability
remains of a great importance: it ensures that within a military alliance, military operations
can be conducted effectively consistent with the legal obligations of each nation.”).
57
For an overview of this legal framework, see, e.g., Philip Alston, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Killings, ¶¶ 28–33
A/HRC//14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter Alston Report]; SUSAN BREAU, MARIE
ARONSSON & RACHEL JOYCE, DISCUSSION PAPER 2: DRONE ATTACKS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND THE RECORDING OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES 3–4 (2011); Rise of the Drones II:
Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. &
Foreign Affs. of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 2, 18–25 (2010)
(statement of Mary Ellen O’Connell, Professor, Univ. of Notre Dame); WATKIN, supra note
21, at 287–300.
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Under the IHRL paradigm, foundational rights that could come into play during
counterterrorism operations include the right to life,58 the right to be free from
torture, cruel, and inhuman, and degrading treatment,59 and a variety of due process
rights, including the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.60 Such rights
are protected in global treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)61 and the Convention Against Torture,62 as well as regional
agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,63 the American Convention on Human Rights,64 and the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights.65 And some of these rights may be deemed
customary international law (and therefore binding on states whether or not they
have ratified specific treaties).66
1. The Use of Lethal Force
As applied to counterterrorism activities, IHRL generally requires state agents
to pursue non-lethal options such as capturing suspects, if at all possible, rather than
using lethal force. The right to life does allow state agents to deploy lethal force in
defense of themselves or others, but only in narrow circumstances. In interpreting
the right to life enshrined in the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee (a treaty body
that monitors implementation of the treaty) has said that “any permissible
deprivation of life must be reasonable, necessary, and proportional to the aims
sought, and must be established under the law with effective institutional safeguards
to protect against potential arbitrary abuses.”67 Under this standard, state agents are
58
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
59
See id. art. 7.
60
See id. art. 9.
61
See id.
62
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1464 U.N.T.S. 85.
63
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
64
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter American Convention].
65
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/6713 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59.
66
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), April 18, 1946, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 (defining customary law as “general practice [of states] accepted as law”); see
also Int’l L. Comm., Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law
with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018).
67
Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, § II.12, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment No. 36]; (“In order not to be
qualified as arbitrary under article 6, the application of potentially lethal force by a private
person acting in self-defense, or by another person coming to his or her defence, must be
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not authorized to undertake planned killings of specific persons.68 Rather, state
agents are permitted to use lethal force only if the need were to arise while pursuing
other lawful law-enforcement objectives, such as conducting surveillance, making
an arrest, or protecting others at risk of harm.69 Thus, courts and tribunals have
generally concluded that, when state agents are pursuing terrorism suspects, the
obligation to respect the right to life prohibits agents from proceeding to lethal
options unless they first determine that other non-lethal options, such as capture, are
not feasible.70
In addition, even if capture is deemed infeasible, IHRL still sets a high bar for
targeting a terrorism suspect with lethal force. In particular, IHRL restricts the use
of lethal force to situations in which there is a strict71 or absolute72 necessity, and
any use of force must be proportionate to the threat.73 A strict or absolute necessity
strictly necessary in view of the threat posed by the attacker.”). UN Human Rights Committee
Clarifies, Expands Guidance on Right to Life, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://ijrcenter.org/2018/11/20/un-human-rights-committee-clarifies-expands-guidanceon-right-to-life/ [https://perma.cc/UL5V-TQ4S]; see also General Comment No. 36, ¶ 10
(2018).
68
As the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Summary and Extrajudicial Killings has noted,
under IHRL “a targeted killing in the sense of an intentional, premeditated and deliberate
killing by law enforcement officials cannot be legal because, unlike in armed conflict, it is
never permissible for killing to be the sole objective of an operation.” Alston Report, supra
note 57,¶ 33.
69
See id. For example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has concluded
that the European Convention permits the use of lethal force only when state agents are
pursuing other, authorized law-enforcement activities, and then only when the use of such
force is absolutely necessary. See, e.g., Erdoğan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 57049/00,
¶ 86 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-75148 [https://perma.cc/S86Q-RJ84].
70
See, e.g., McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, ¶ 200 (1995)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57943 [https://perma.cc/VS79-C4RC] (concluding that
U.K. soldiers who shot and killed terrorism suspects had an honest belief that those suspects
were about to detonate a bomb, and that there was no time to pursue means lesser than the
use of lethal force—such as capture). Indeed, even when there is a risk that a terrorism
suspect might escape capture, the use of lethal force is not permissible unless there are other
reasons to justify the killing as absolutely necessary, such as the risk of harm to others.
Kakoulli v. Turkey, App. No. 38595/97, ¶ 121 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00171208 [https://perma.cc/Y3NW-ZWPC]; see also Alston Report, supra note 57, ¶ 32.
71
See General Comment No. 36, supra note 67; see also Miguel Castro-Castro Prison
v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, ¶
239 (Nov. 25, 2006) (“State police forces may only recur to the use of lethal weapons when
it is strictly inevitable to protect a life and when less extreme measures result ineffective.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
72
See, e.g., Tagayeva and Others v. Russia, App. No. 26562/07, ¶ 595 (Apr. 13, 2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-172660 [https://perma.cc/4TTS-M77Q].
73
See Alston Report, supra note 57, ¶ 32. In the Inter-American human rights system,
the Inter-American Court has likewise noted that state agents who use lethal force to protect
the security of the population do not necessarily violate the right to life; however, any use of
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standard is difficult to satisfy because it requires, for example, that the suspect pose
a threat to the life of others, and in some formulations such a threat must be
“imminent.”74 Further, it requires a determination that “there is no other means . . .
of preventing that threat to life.”75 If the strict or absolute necessity threshold cannot
be reached, lethal force would be off the table.
International human rights law further requires state agents to assess and
minimize the impact of any use of force on civilians who might, for example, be in
the vicinity of the terrorist target.76 For example, even in the process of conducting
an operation to thwart known terrorists posing a threat to others, the strict necessity
standard encompasses a “duty of care” for state agents to evaluate the risk of harm
to any civilians who might be affected and take steps to limit any harm to those
civilians.77 While the precise standard is not entirely clear, it is a stringent one. Thus,
even if authorities were to conclude that the target posed a continuing, imminent
threat, their hands would nonetheless likely be tied if they could not minimize harm
to civilians in a use-of-force operation.
2. Detention
Application of IHRL would also have important consequences for any decision
to detain a terrorism suspect. International human rights law mandates minimum
standards regarding the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees, as well
as due process requirements regarding access to a lawyer, charges to be filed before
an independent court within a specific period of time, notice of such charges to the

force must not be “disproportionate.” Neira-Alegría et al. v. Peru, Merits, Judgement, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, ¶¶ 69, 72, 76 (Jan. 19, 1995) (concluding that Peru violated
the right to life of three persons convicted of terrorism when state agents killed them in jail).
74
See, e.g., Miguel Castro-Castro Prison, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (serc. C) No. 20, ¶ 245
(concluding that there was no justification for the use of force by state agents during an
alleged prison riot of terrorism suspects because there was no imminent threat to the state
agents, “nor was there any need of self-defense, or an i[m]minent danger of death or serious
injuries against the police officers”). Special Provision 9 of the UN Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials specifies that “enforcement
officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others
against the imminent threat of death or serious injury . . . [and] lethal use of firearms may
only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.” U.N. Conference on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Eighth United Nations Congress on
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 114, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
75
Alston Report, supra note 57, ¶ 32.
76
See, e.g., Tagayeva, App. No. 26562/07, ¶ 603; Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey,
App. No. 21689/93, ¶ 308 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61696
[https://perma.cc/8FQ6-98ET].
77
See, e.g., Ahmet Özkan, App. No. 21689/93, ¶ 297.
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detainee, and so on.78 As discussed below, there is disagreement about the precise
IHRL obligations authorities must follow regarding detainees within an armed
conflict,79 but there is general agreement that IHL/LOAC does not require the same
rigorous due process standards as IHRL.
3. Procedural Elements
Finally, IHRL may restrict the type of personnel permitted to conduct
operations, and it may also dictate procedures those personnel must follow. For
example, under IHRL, any operations conducted by military personnel rather than
law enforcement may raise red flags.80 The use of military equipment and weaponry
may similarly prompt significant questions about whether the state is upholding its
IHRL commitments. International human rights law further mandates that states
must set forth and follow plans and procedures in conducting security operations,
including, if possible, assessing operations in advance.81 And states must adequately
investigate and evaluate operations afterward to assess possible human rights
violations that may have occurred.82
4. Extraterritoriality Issues
Although IHRL seems to provide a clear, stringent framework for regulating
the counterterrorism activities of states, it should be noted that some of these
counterterrorism activities raise complicated jurisdictional questions that could
thwart the applicability of IHRL and may vary depending on the type of operation.83
In particular, most global and regional IHRL treaties include provisions stating that
78
For a good overview of these obligations under the European Convention, see
Mohammed and Others v. Ministry of Defence and Another [2017] UKSC 1, 18–19 (appeal
taken from EWHC & EWCA (Civ)); Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2017]
UKSC 2, 2 (appeal taken from EWHC & EWCA (Civ)).
79
For a more detailed discussion of different interpretations of IHRL as it applies to
extraterritorial military detention, see Dickinson, Administrative Law Values, supra note 34.
80
See, e.g., McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, ¶ 212, ECHR
(1995), translated in 41 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1039 (2018),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57943 [https://perma.cc/6PAS-WU9] (noting that it
was not clear whether military personnel had the same level of training that police officers
are required to have about the legal responsibilities law enforcement officials have before
using lethal force).
81
See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 11, 54, 183, 203; see also Carandiru v. Brasil, Case 11.291, InterAm. Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 34/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. ¶¶ 61, 66, 91
(1999).
82
See, e.g., Finogenov v. Russia, 2011-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, ¶ 282; Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶ 166; Cruz Sánchez v. Perú, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 292 (Apr. 17,
2015).
83
For a comprehensive examination of these issues, see generally YUVAL SHANY, THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2021).
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these obligations apply within the “territory” or “jurisdiction” of the state.84
Accordingly, a key question is the extent to which the idea of “jurisdiction” in these
treaties should include counterterrorism activities undertaken extraterritorially.
The United Nations committees charged with monitoring states’
implementation of global human rights treaties and United Nations Special
Rapporteurs have taken a broad approach to jurisdiction. They have generally
concluded that these treaties impose obligations on states parties globally regardless
of location or type of activity. Thus, the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
which monitors the ICCPR, has articulated a framework that essentially would
require the global application of that treaty.85 Similarly, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur for Summary Executions has argued that, with respect to the use of lethal
force, “the legality of a killing outside the context of armed conflict is governed by
human rights standards . . . .”86
Regional courts and tribunals have adopted somewhat varying jurisprudence on
the issue. The European Court of Human Rights has adopted a context-specific
approach. Although cases have fluctuated in their precise formulation, relevant
factors include the degree of power or control that state agents have over rights84
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 2.1 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”); European Convention, supra
note 63, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”); American
Convention, supra note 64, art. 1 (“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect
the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure all persons subject to their
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms . . . .”).
85
For example, the recent General Comment 36 of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, which interprets the right life as set forth in Article 6 of the ICCPR, articulated
a very broad view of the scope of the treaty as defined in Article 2 (1): “In light of article 2,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant, a State party has an obligation to respect and to ensure the
rights under article 6 of all persons who are within its territory and all persons subject to its
jurisdiction, that is, all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life it exercises power
or effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory effectively controlled
by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in
a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner.” General Comment No. 36, supra note 67, ¶ 63.
This approach, which holds that the treaty’s obligations extend to persons directly or
foreseeably “impacted” by state operations is much broader than that of the European Court
of Human Rights, interpreting an analogous provision of the European Convention discussed
below. Commentators have suggested that the “impact” approach essentially imposes global
obligations on states. See, e.g., Daniel Møgster, Towards Universality: Activities Impacting
the Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR, EJIL:
TALK! (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/towards-universality-activities-impactingthe-enjoyment-of-the-right-to-life-and-the-extraterritorial-application-of-the-iccpr/ [https://
perma.cc/M9AK-Q22V]. For an overview of approaches to extraterritoriality under human
rights treaties, see KAREN DA COSTA, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SELECTED
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013); MARKO MILANOVIC, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011).
86
Alston Report, supra note 57,¶ 31.
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bearing individuals, as well as effective or overall control by a state of a particular
territory.87 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has taken a somewhat
broader view, recently concluding that IHRL obligations extend beyond
circumstances in which the state controls persons or territory to include situations in
which there is a “causal” nexus between conduct performed within the territory of
the State and a human rights violation occurring abroad.88 Similarly, the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African Commission) has issued a
general comment asserting that state obligations under the Charter are triggered not
only when the state has “effective authority, power, or control over . . . the victim,”
but also over the “perpetrator.”89
Thus, assuming the jurisdictional hurdles can be overcome, IHRL provides a
robust framework for regulating the counterterrorism activities of a state. Treating
terrorist acts as crimes, this body of law requires states to conduct rights-based law

87

Thus, when a state agent has custody over an individual in detention, the applicability
of Convention obligations is most clear. See, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV
Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶ 136. The use of lethal force presents a more open question, with ground
operations in areas controlled by the state more likely to trigger Convention obligations than
operations conducted from the air. See Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R.
23, ¶ 71 (Nov. 16, 2004) (“[A] State may . . . be held accountable for violation of Convention
rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State but who are found to
be under the former State’s authority and control through its agents operating . . . in the latter
State[.]”); Banković v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 (concluding that Convention
obligations do not extend to airstrikes in countries outside Council of Europe countries).
88
The Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) No. 23, ¶¶ 95, 101–03 (Nov. 15, 2017). The court, therefore, did not quite go
so far as to conclude that state obligations are triggered for every act imputed to a state agent,
but did determine the state has a duty of care with respect to the extraterritorial acts of its
agents. For a discussion of extraterritoriality in this advisory opinion, see Antal Berkes, A
New Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Link Recognized by the IACtHR, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L.
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-new-extraterritorial-jurisdictional-linkrecognised-by-the-iacthr/ [https://perma.cc/5DRU-ULDV]; Maria L. Banda, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, 22 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 10, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/6/
inter-american-court-human-rights-advisory-opinion-environment-and-human [https://per
ma.cc/23J4-KSLU].
89
Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & People’s Rts., General Comment No. 3 on the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4), ¶ 14 (Nov. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3]. For an overview of extraterritoriality in the African
human rights system, see Lilian Chenwi & Takele Soboka Bulto, Extraterritoriality in the
African Regional Human Rights System from a Comparative Perspective, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS FROM AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 13–62
(Lilian Chenwi & Takele Soboka Bulto eds. 2018). Moreover, the Commission determined
that a state is responsible not only when it “exercises effective control over the territory on
which the victim’s rights are affected,” but also if the state “engages in conduct which could
reasonably be foreseen to result in an unlawful deprivation of life.” General Comment No.
3, at ¶ 14.
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enforcement operations rather than allowing states to treat terrorists as part of an
ongoing global war.
B. The International Humanitarian Law/Law of Armed Conflict Paradigm
International humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict
(IHL/LOAC), provides a far more permissive framework for counterterrorism
operations than the law-enforcement/human rights model. The precise rules differ
depending on the type of armed conflict—either international or non-international.
Because contemporary counterterrorism operations do not generally entail
international armed conflicts between and among states, this Article focuses on the
rules for non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). But the fundamental principles
of this body of law are the same in both types of conflicts. These principles, which
include distinction, proportionality, feasible precautions, and military necessity,90
seek to protect human dignity even in the midst of armed conflict. Yet, applying
these principles generally gives broader leeway to those conducting armed conflict
than IHRL would allow.
1. The Use of Lethal Force
To begin with, under IHL/LOAC, there would generally be no obligation to
capture, rather than kill, a legitimate target taking part in hostilities,91 assuming that
the armed forces conducting the strike followed the fundamental principles of
IHL/LOAC. The principle of distinction mandates that only military objects or
certain types of individuals may be targeted for attack. Civilians92 and civilian
objects,93 for example, may not be targeted. But those who are combatants94 or who
are taking a direct part in hostilities95 may be the object of attack (provided other
IHL/LOAC principles are followed), and there is no obligation to capture rather than
kill them.
To be sure, there is considerable disagreement about how individuals are
classified. For example, individuals taking a direct part in hostilities may be targeted
only for such time as they are doing so.96 Yet states and other entities disagree about
90
For the U.S. view on these priniciples, see 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note
19, at 20–21.
91
See Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s ‘The
Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants,’ 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 855 (2013). For a contrary
view, see Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 819 (2013).
92
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51.3, adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 [hereinafter Protocol I].
93
Id. art. 52.1.
94
Id. art. 43.2.
95
Id. art. 51.3.
96
Id.
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the scope of this rule and its elements.97 In addition, separate from that question, the
United States has maintained that mere membership in a particular armed group
deemed hostile to the United States, such as specific terrorist organizations, renders
one subject to attack.98 Other states have disagreed with such a broad classification,
asserting instead that the only relevant question in a NIAC is whether the individual
is taking a direct part in hostilities.99
Even apart from the “capture versus kill” decision, IHL/LOAC also provides a
very different approach from IHRL regarding the use of lethal force. For example,
IHL/LOAC does not require armed forces to assess the imminence of a threat before
deploying lethal force.100 Rather, the key issue is whether those deploying force are
respecting the fundamental principles of IHL/LOAC. Thus, in addition to satisfying
the principle of distinction discussed above, armed forces would need to determine
whether military necessity justified the attack,101 whether any precautions such as
dropping leaflets or providing other warnings in the area of the attack were
feasible,102 and whether the attack was proportionate.103
Accordingly, military authorities applying the principle of proportionality must
assess whether an attack is expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, to the degree that
the civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.104 This calculus, while significant, is much less restrictive
than the corresponding duty of care under IHRL, which, as noted above, requires
authorities to ensure that civilians will not be harmed.
2. Detention
Detention obligations also differ under IHL/LOAC from those under IHRL.
First, considerable ambiguity remains regarding states’ obligations in NIACs with
regard to detainees, who would not qualify as prisoners of war (POWs) because that
97

See, e.g., INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 5–63 (2009) (prepared
by Nils Melzer) (“The Interpretive Guidance provides a legal reading of the notion of ‘direct
participation in hositilities’ with a view to strengthening the implementation of the principle
of distinction.”); Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian
Immunity in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress Through Practice, 88
INT’L L. STUD. 181, 188 (2012).
98
2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 20.
99
See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel 62(1) PD 507, ¶ 24
[2006] (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 375, 385 (2007). Under this
framework, membership in a group, and the role an individual plays within that group, might
be relevant to determine whether that individual performs a “continuous combat function.”
100
Protocol I, supra note 92, arts. 51.2, 51.5(b), 57.2(a)(iii).
101
Id. arts 51.5(b), 57.2(a)(iii), 54.5.
102
Id. art. 57.
103
Id. arts. 51.5(b), 57.2(a)(iii).
104
Id. arts. 51.5(b), 57.2(a)(iii).
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status is reserved only for certain detainees in international armed conflicts.105
Second, even assuming fairly substantive obligations regarding treatment and
process—for example, to establish the status of detainees—IHL/LOAC could permit
detention for the duration of hostilities for some categories of detainees, and does
not necessarily mandate that detainees be charged with, and prosecuted for, a crime
within a particular time frame or even at all.106
3. Procedural Obligations
Finally, IHL/LOAC does require states to follow certain procedures, but they
do not match the procedural obligations of IHRL. The IHL/LOAC requirement to
take feasible precautions107 could be construed as a kind of procedural rule—to
consider whether civilians could be warned in a particular operation. This body of
law also contemplates a role for lawyers to provide decision-making advice,
although as a practical matter, the extent of that advice may differ depending on the
time available to make a decision about an operation, a distinction between so-called
“deliberate” and “dynamic” targeting.108 If there is a possibility that war crimes have
occurred, IHL/LOAC imposes an obligation to investigate and prosecute those
crimes.109 But these procedural requirements are not as extensive as the type of
advance planning or after-the-fact investigation mandated by IHRL.
C. The Jus Ad Bellum Paradigm
The jus ad bellum is another body of law relevant to extraterritorial
counterterrorism operations because it regulates the resort to force by one state in
the territory of another state. Unlike the differences among states over the scope of
IHL/LOAC and its intersection with IHRL, the applicability of this body of law to
extraterritorial counterterrorism operations is not generally a matter of disagreement.
But because states have differed in their interpretation of some key elements, and
categories from this body of law have found their way into the U.S. policies
described below, I will briefly mention it here. Furthermore, if the United States
were to adopt a more limited view of armed conflict zones and the applicability of
IHL/LOAC, differences between the United States and allies over the interpretation
of ad bellum categories could become even more apparent.

105

See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 40.
For a more detailed treatment of this issue, see Dickinson, Administrative Law
Values, supra note 34.
107
Protocol I, supra note 92, art. 57.
108
See Jennifer O’Connor, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Applying the Law of
Targeting to the Modern Battlefield, Remarks at N.Y.U. Sch. of Law (Nov. 28, 2016)
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Applying-the-Law-of-Targeting-to-theModern-Battlefield.pdf [https://perma.cc/D74N-XRWA].
109
See Michael N. Schmitt, Investigating Violations of International Law in Armed
Conflict, 2 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J. 31, 36–39 (2011).
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The key principles of the jus ad bellum can be found in the United Nations
Charter110 and customary international law.111 States may not generally intervene112
in another state without its consent except in two circumstances: if the United
Nations Security Council has authorized the intervention,113 or if the state
conducting the intervention is acting in individual or collective self-defense.114
Although some advocate a third exception to justify intervention on humanitarian
grounds,115 this exception is not widely accepted.116
The self-defense exception has sparked disagreement with regard to
counterterrorism operations. Under this doctrine, a state may act if it (or an ally) is
under armed attack or one that is imminent, and any response is necessary and
proportionate.117 As discussed below, the United States differs from some allies on
the meaning of “imminence.” Furthermore, in the case of attacks by non-state actors,
a rule has emerged that a state may respond on the territory of another state where
those non-state actors are located if that state is “unwilling or unable” to mitigate the
threat posed by the non-state actors.118
D. States’ Contrasting Approaches
The United States and other allied nations have often embraced contrasting
legal paradigms when they have engaged in extraterritorial counterterrorism
110

See U.N. Charter, arts. 2, 39–43, 51
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27).
112
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
113
Id. arts. 39–43.
114
Id. art. 51.
115
See, e.g., Letter from the Rt. Hon. Hugh Robertson MP, UK Minister of State,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, to the Rt. Hon. Sir Richard Ottaway MP UK House of
Commons (Jan. 14, 2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Letter-fromUK-Foreign-Commonwealth-Office-to-the-House-of-Commons-Foreign-Affairs-Committ
ee-on-Humanitarian-Intervention-and-the-Responsibility-to-Protect.pdf [https://perma.cc/P
468-2STC] (providing responses to questions about the UK Government’s position on
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect); Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and
the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward),
EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of-humanitarianintervention-part-ii-international-law-and-the-way-forward/
[https://perma.cc/U69PKXDD] (discussing “why President Obama did not violate international law by threatening
to use force in Syria in the face of a persistent Russian veto, and how the Syria crisis might
best evolve from here”).
116
Notably, the United States does not acknowledge the legal theory in its summary of
ad bellum law in the Frameworks Report. 2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 8–
11.
117
U.N. Charter art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 35, 237 (June 27).
118
For a discussion of this emerging rule and disputes about it, see Deeks, supra note
44, at 486.
111
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operations outside traditional battlefields. In general, the United States has adopted
the IHL/LOAC framework, also sometimes dubbed the “conduct of hostilities
approach,” and has maintained that IHL/LOAC applies globally to operations
against specific terrorist groups.119 Furthermore, the United States has taken a fairly
broad approach to defining what counts as self-defense under the jus ad bellum. By
contrast, many U.S. allies have maintained that the conduct of hostilities approach
must be more geographically and temporally constrained.120 Outside this more
circumscribed zone of armed conflict, the law enforcement/IHRL paradigm would
more likely govern, even as to Al Qaeda and ISIS members, along with the jus ad
bellum in the targeting context. And some of these countries have also questioned
the broad approach of the United States to ad bellum rules.
1. United States
The United States has essentially adopted the view that IHL/LOAC applies
globally to certain categories of terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, some Al Qaeda
affiliates, and ISIS. Probably the clearest articulation of this approach can be found
in a report issued during the last days of the Obama administration, the 2016 Report
on Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the United States Use of Military Force
and Related National Security Operations, often termed the “Frameworks
Report.”121 This report synthesizes a variety of prior public statements by top U.S.
officials and assertions in public documents. It reflects the views of the entire U.S.
executive branch. Although the Trump administration reportedly changed some of
the policies outlined in the Obama administration document, a 2018 report to
Congress indicates that the Trump administration did not deviate significantly from
the interpretation of international legal frameworks that the Obama administration
report maps out.122
In particular, the 2016 Frameworks Report stresses that the United States
applies a conduct of hostilities model to extraterritorial counterterrorism operations.
For example, the 2016 Frameworks Report notes that, “in armed conflicts with nonState actors that are prone to shifting operations from country to country, the United
States does not view its ability to use military force against a non-State actor with
which it is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict as limited to ‘hot’ battlefields.”123
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2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
See infra notes 128–60 and accompanying text.
121
2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 1.
122
2018 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 1. The report does not identify any
changes to the international legal frameworks and notes that, “[i]f a particular item or topic
area from the original [Frameworks] report is not covered in this update or its classified
annex, it remains unchanged from the original report.” Id.; see also Allison Murphy & Scott
R. Anderson, We Read the New War Powers Report so You Don’t Have to, LAWFARE (Mar.
14, 2018, 5:37 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-read-new-war-powers-report-so-youdont-have [https://perma.cc/FL6H-3VQA].
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2016 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.
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The report treats groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS as enemy forces within this
ongoing, potentially global, armed conflict.
In addition to viewing the armed conflict as broad in geographic scope, the
United States has taken an expansive approach to the temporal duration of the armed
conflict. Thus, it has asserted that the armed conflict against terrorist groups will not
end until “the United States will degrade and dismantle the operational capacity and
supporting networks of terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida to such an extent that
they will have been effectively destroyed and will no longer be able to attempt or
launch a strategic attack against the United States.”124 Only at that point will there
“no longer be an ongoing armed conflict between the United States and those
forces.”125
This view leads the United States to apply IHL/LOAC to a variety of
extraterritorial counterterrorism operations, including targeting and detention. The
United States also takes the position that, within armed conflict, IHL/LOAC rules
generally displace any otherwise applicable IHRL rules. Thus, for the United States,
the relatively more permissive IHL/LOAC rules govern, whether in making
targeting decisions or in detaining terrorism suspects linked to the armed conflict.
The United States also takes a broad view of the rules allowing the use of force
in self-defense under the jus ad bellum. Although such use of force is permissible
only if the force is necessary and an armed attack has occurred or is imminent, the
United States has interpreted “imminence” quite expansively, emphasizing that
imminence must be understood in light of “modern-day capabilities, techniques, and
technological innovations of terrorist organizations.”126 Moreover, the United States
has said that once it determines that it is acting in self-defense against a certain
group, “it is not necessary as a matter of international law to reassess whether an
armed attack is occurring or imminent prior to every subsequent action taken against
that group, provided that hostilities have not ended.”127
2. Alternative Approach of Some U.S. Allies: Germany and the United Kingdom
Some U.S. allies have embraced a more constrained approach to the reach of
IHL/LOAC and instead have given broader scope to the law enforcement paradigm,
which often entails applying IHRL to extraterritorial operations against terrorist
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Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
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Id. at 9.
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groups.128 Some allies have also adopted a more limited view of the conditions under
which force is permissible using a self-defense theory.129
The narrower approach of these allies applies in part to the geographic scope of
any armed conflict occurring with terrorist organizations. Their approach limits the
application of the IHL/LOAC paradigm to traditional, geographically defined,
armed conflict zones. Thus, the domain of a NIAC against terrorist organizations is
confined to the geographic boundaries of the territory where the specific armed
conflict is most obviously occurring. As John Brennan, the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, noted in 2011, “Others in the
international community—including some of our closest allies and partners—take a
different view of the geographic scope of the conflict, limiting it only to the ‘hot’
battlefields.”130 For such states, IHL/LOAC targeting and detention is generally
permissible only in a territorial battlefield.131 Outside these zones, such states
typically follow a law-enforcement paradigm that generally entails the
implementation of IHRL, although as discussed above, the precise scope of the
specific human rights obligations depends on an analysis of whether each obligation
applies extraterritorially. Thus, a 2013 report on a meeting of experts and European
government officials noted that, as to extraterritorial targeted killings, “[a] core
divergence between the U.S. and European positions revolves around their
respective views that contemporary targeted killing operations were conducted
under the paradigm of armed conflict and hence governed by IHL, or fell under law
enforcement operations regulated by human rights law.”132 There is a similar
divergence as to extraterritorial detention operations because the ECHR has
specifically held that the human rights obligations of the European Convention apply
to extraterritorial detention.
128
See Nehal Bhuta & Hin-Yan Liu, Targeted Killing, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
EU
Policy,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME
1,
3
(Mar.
2013),
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/27737/2013-1-Policy%20Brief_RSCAS_GGP.
PDF?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/XB5B-PS26]; John O. Brennan, Ass’t to the President
for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at
Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws
(Sept. 16, 2011) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remark
s-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an [https://perma.cc/TN
9L-TXAK] [hereinafter Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks]; see also Marco Sassoli,
The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed
Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 34, 56 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed. 2011) (stating that many U.S. allies limit the applicability
of IHL/LOAC to hot battlefields such as Afghanistan).
129
See, e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICY ON THE USE OF DRONES FOR TARGETED KILLING,
SECOND REPORT OF SESSION 2015–16, HL Paper 141, HC 574, at 45–48 (UK) [hereinafter
2016 UK Parliament Drone Report].
130
See Brennan, Harvard Law School Remarks, supra note 128; Sassoli, supra note
128, at 56.
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Sassoli, supra note 128, at 228.
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In addition to taking a more geographically constrained approach to armed
conflict, many U.S. allies also view armed conflicts as more limited temporally than
the United States. They would not necessarily agree that the armed conflict against
a non-state actor only ends when that non-state actor is “unable to launch a strategic
attack.” Such language in the 2016 Frameworks Report goes beyond existing
statements about the end of hostilities under IHL/LOAC in international courts and
tribunals.133 Finally, many U.S. allies do not share the expansive U.S. conception of
“imminence” in the doctrine of self-defense within the jus ad bellum discussed
above.134
It is often difficult to pinpoint states’ precise views because government
officials do not always articulate them publicly. As noted in the summary of the
2013 meeting of experts and European officials cited above, “European
governments reject the paradigm [of global war], but do not comment on U.S. strikes
undertaken in reliance on the paradigm.”135 Moreover, different branches within
each government sometimes articulate different positions. Views can evolve over
time. And views may differ as to different types of military operations, such as
targeted killings and detention. A series of recent cases, reports, and publications
have shed some more light on the positions of two key U.S. allies: Germany and the
United Kingdom.
(a) Germany
Several cases in Germany highlight the discrepancy between German and U.S.
approaches to the legal framework governing extraterritorial counterterrorism
operations. These cases illustrate the divergence of views between the United States
and Germany over the scope of the battlefield, the role of IHRL in such operations,
and what constitutes self-defense. The cases also demonstrate the complexity of
assessing a particular government’s position when litigation exposes differences in
views among multiple branches of a country’s government. Despite this complexity,
however, it is clear that there is substantial daylight between the U.S. and German
approaches to interpreting the scope and applicability of international legal
paradigms.
The most recent German case capturing such discrepancies arises from ongoing
litigation challenging German involvement in U.S. targeted killing operations in
Yemen through the use of Ramstein airbase, located in southwestern Germany.136
Reports had indicated that Ramstein contains a U.S. drone control center, where data
133

For an excellent overview of the different approaches to the end of armed conflict,
see Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. 143 (2014).
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Bhuta & Liu, supra note 128, at 3.
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Id. at 4. The report further notes that “[s]ome experts advocate a more vocal
objection to the U.S. invocation of the armed conflict paradigm . . . because . . . no European
State has accepted this paradigm even after a series of terrorist attacks post-9/11.” Id. at 3.
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Emma DiNapoli, German Courts Weigh Legal Responsibility for U.S. Drone Strikes,
LAWFARE (Apr. 4, 2019, 9:18 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/german-courts-weighlegal-responsibility-us-drone-strikes [https://perma.cc/L5KZ-JEBZ].
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is routed via fiber optic cables to the drones conducting the strikes.137 Relatives of
individuals killed in U.S. strikes brought suit in German courts under the German
Basic Law (similar to a constitution), including its right to life provision and a
provision that allows German courts to consider international law.138 The lower court
dismissed the case on the ground that the issues were too sensitive for judicial
review, but an appellate court reversed, in part.139
Without drawing conclusions as to the legality of any specific strikes, the
appellate court concluded that Germany has an obligation to investigate the strikes
in part because of systematic problems it identifies regarding U.S. interpretation of
international law.140 In particular, the decision cited as problematic the U.S.
assumption that there is a global armed conflict against al Qaeda and its affiliates,
rather than assessing the existence of an armed conflict in a particular geographic
area.141 Although the court ultimately concluded that an armed conflict was
occurring in the area of Yemen where the strikes occurred, it cited the U.S. approach
to this issue as one reason why Germany must conduct its own independent
investigation into the legality of the strikes.142
The court also expressed concern about the U.S. view regarding the content of
several other international legal commitments applicable to the strikes. For example,
the court signaled that it would not necessarily accept the U.S. interpretation of the
jus ad bellum.143 The court expressed concern about the U.S. failure to recognize the
applicability of human rights protections guaranteeing the right to life within an
armed conflict.144 And the court noted that the United States takes an overly broad
view of persons who may be targeted under IHL/LOAC itself.145 At the time this
Article goes to press, another appellate court has now limited the scope of this
decision, but plaintiffs have appealed that ruling to the German Constitutional
137
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Court.146 No matter how the highest court ultimately frames its decision, the
litigation illustrates that German officials must grapple with interpretations of
international law that contrast with those of the United States, even as they
collaborate with the United States on counterterrorism operations.
(b) The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has also differed in its approach to the legal paradigms
applicable to extraterritorial counterterrorism operations, as compared to the United
States. The full contours of the UK view are somewhat difficult to discern, as public
debates within the United Kingdom clarify some aspects but leave others
ambiguous. In particular, governmental actors within different branches of
government have expressed slightly varying positions. Nonetheless, it is clear that,
like Germany, the United Kingdom generally adopts a more confined view of the
battlefield than does the United States.
A 2016 exchange between a Parliamentary Committee and the UK executive
branch regarding drone strikes targeting UK citizens fighting for ISIS highlights
areas of contrast between the United Kingdom and the United States, even as it
suggests that Parliament and the executive branch do not necessarily see eye to eye
on every dimension of the legal issues in question.147 The United Kingdom
conducted one strike directly and worked “hand in glove” with the United States,
which conducted the others.148 Parliament launched an inquiry to determine the legal
basis of the strikes.149 Although the Government clarified that it believed the
particular strikes were conducted within a NIAC (a point that was unclear at the start
of the inquiry), it also stated that it might use lethal force (via drone or otherwise)
extraterritorially outside of armed conflict in places such as in Libya.150
Significantly, the inquiry concluded that “the UK government does not take the U.S.
position that it is in a global war against ISIL/Da’esh such that it can use lethal force
against them anywhere in the world.”151
Parliament and the UK Government appeared to differ slightly, however, on
the legal basis for any use of lethal force by the United Kingdom outside of armed
conflict. The Parliamentary committee that conducted the inquiry concluded that the
legal basis for action outside of armed conflict would be IHRL and the law regarding
146
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national self-defense.152 Yet, according to the inquiry report, the UK Government
had asserted it would apply IHL/LOAC and the law of national self-defense in such
circumstances, contending that IHL/LOAC sufficiently incorporated IHRL.153 The
committee concluded, however, that it took issue with the Government’s assertion
that following IHL/LOAC outside of armed conflict will satisfy any human rights
obligations, as the “conventional view” is that IHL/LOAC does not apply outside of
armed conflict.154
In the detention context, the 2017 decision of the UK Supreme Court in the
Serdar Mohammed155 case further highlights the difference in approaches between
the United Kingdom and the United States. In that case, detainees held by the United
Kingdom in extraterritorial military detention challenged various aspects of that
detention under the European Convention. Although that case involved detention
within armed conflict (in Afghanistan), the court’s willingness to apply relatively
robust due process protections in that context indicates that such protections (or even
more stringent protections) would govern any extraterritorial military detention
conducted by the United Kingdom outside the bounds of armed conflict.
3. Ambiguity and Overlap
The conflict between the legal paradigms discussed above may not always be
quite as sharp as it may seem at first blush. It is important to acknowledge that the
precise rules within each of the paradigms described above are often contested and
may, in some contexts, be stretched to resemble one another. In addition, the conduct
of hostilities and law-enforcement paradigms are not necessarily mutually exclusive
and may overlap in some circumstances. Furthermore, both paradigms intersect with
the self-defense framework. As a result, the conflict between the conduct of
hostilities and law-enforcement approaches may not always be a stark one.
International human rights law, for example, is not a straightjacket and allows
room for flexibility when states conduct counterterrorism operations. Indeed, the
European Court of Human Rights has in some opinions interpreted human rights
obligations, including the right to life, to give states a fair degree of latitude to
conduct such operations. In the Finogenov decision,156 for example, the Court
addressed a heavy-handed Russian operation to rescue civilians from a terrorist
attack on a Moscow theatre in 2002. During the rescue, Russian authorities used
military-like tactics and deployed a mysterious gas that killed hundreds of people.
Although the Court faulted Russia for insufficient accountability and transparency,
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it took a relatively lenient approach to the underlying substantive rights even within
Russian territory.
Similarly, the precise content of some IHL/LOAC obligations remains
uncertain, particularly in NIACs, where the treaty law is less developed. The Geneva
Conventions address NIACs primarily only in common article 3, and not all states
have ratified Additional Protocol II, which pertains to NIACs. Furthermore, the
status of customary international law as it applies to NIACs is contested and
ambiguous. States have not helped matters much because they have not generally
provided much clarification regarding whether the practices they undertake in
NIACs are followed as a matter of legal obligation. The recent Department of
Defense Law of War Manual, which runs more than a thousand pages, devotes only
one scant chapter to NIACs.157
In addition to ambiguity regarding the content of norms, there is also
considerable debate about the extent to which the legal paradigms overlap, and if so,
how they intersect. Within an armed conflict, under the doctrine of lex specialis, is
IHRL completely inapplicable? Does it govern some situations unrelated to the
armed conflict? Or does it govern in some situations related to the armed conflict,
such as the interrogation of detainees? Or might it inform the interpretation of
standards within IHL/LOAC? There is a multitude of views about this topic. Ken
Watkin, who formerly served as Canada’s top military lawyer, has noted that it is
“no longer practically possible in the post 9-11 period to rely on traditional
exclusionary views of the law or provide relatively simple answers based on the
‘black-letter’ law of the 1949 Geneva Conventions governing inter-state conflict.”158
He observed that the “counterterrorism operating environment is simply too
complex to permit such a simple, even static response.”159
Nevertheless, these approaches continue to serve as competing paradigms that
have concrete consequences, and the bottom line in all of this debate is that
fundamentally the United States has adopted a very different approach from its allies
on these questions. Indeed, the 2016 Frameworks Report acknowledges these
differences and notes that allies meet regularly to address the operational
consequences of this disagreement.160
II. LEGALIZED POLICIES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS
Even as the United States has embraced a war paradigm with respect to the
international law regime governing its activities against certain terrorist
organizations, it has nonetheless, as a matter of policy at the international level,
imposed certain additional restrictions on its operations. These restrictions consist
157
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of rules that are more demanding than the minimum legal requirements the United
States has said it is obligated to follow under international law. But they are policies
that effectively reflect aspects of the very international human rights norms that the
government formally says it is not required to obey.
Historically, states have regularly adopted such restrictions in the form of rules
of engagement, which are military rules specific to a particular armed conflict that
may exceed the minimum obligations imposed under IHL/LOAC. But the pressures
of contemporary armed conflicts, marked by protracted NIACs with terrorist
organizations, have sparked new circumstances for such policies. This Part examines
two such policies. First, it discusses the Obama administration’s policy for targeting
terrorist suspects abroad, entitled the Presidential Policy Guidance on Procedures
for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United
States and Areas of Active Hostilities (PPG).161 Second, it describes the periodic
review board (PRB) process instituted to address the ongoing detention of terrorism
suspects at Guantanamo Bay naval base.162 In both cases, the policies include
elements that exceed the legal minimum requirements imposed by IHL/LOAC and
resemble, to some degree, elements of IHRL. Moreover, in both cases, although the
Trump administration reportedly discarded some aspects of these policies, critical
elements appear to have survived even in an administration critical of international
legal restrictions.
A. The PPG Framework
The PPG provided a detailed framework for using force against terrorists
outside territories described as “areas of active hostilities,”163 in other words, outside
geographic areas universally recognized as armed conflict zones. Significantly, the
term “areas of active hostilities” does not correspond to any accepted legal category
within IHL/LOAC, a point that has sparked some controversy in part because it has
enabled the U.S. executive branch to determine unilaterally which territories qualify.
The term has been interpreted, however, to refer to territories outside zones that
would unequivocally be understood to be sites of armed conflict within existing
IHL/LOAC tests for armed conflict. In the Frameworks Report, the United States
identified the specific places that it deemed at the time to be “areas of active
hostilities.” In December 2016, the date of the first Frameworks Report, those areas
included Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, designated areas in Libya, and U.S. actions to
defend U.S. or partner interests outside the terrorism context, such as the 2016 U.S.
military strikes on radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.164
Outside these “areas of active hostilities,” the PPG provided a detailed set of
substantive and procedural rules for “direct action” against terrorist targets,
including the use of lethal force and capture. With respect to substantive rules, the
161
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PPG required that lethal force could only be used against a target that posed a
“continuing, imminent threat” to U.S. persons.165 In addition, the PPG mandated
that, before lethal action could be taken, a determination had to be made that there
was (1) near certainty that the terrorist target is present and that non-combatants
would not be injured or killed;166 (2) an assessment that capture was not feasible at
the time of the operation;167 (3) an assessment that the relevant governmental
authorities in the country where action is contemplated were unwilling/unable to
effectively address the threat;168 and (4) an assessment that no other reasonable
alternatives existed to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons.169
In addition to these substantive rules, the PPG also imposed rigorous procedural
requirements. For example, the PPG mandated that certain individuals or entities
had to approve operations.170 In many cases involving the use of lethal force, senior
executive branch officials were required to review and approve the operation.171
The Trump administration reportedly retained some, but not all, of these
requirements.172 The administration did not release a report of comparable detail
outlining its policy, but it acknowledged that “[t]he United States continues, as a
matter of policy, to apply heightened targeting standards that are more protective of
civilians than are required under the law of armed conflict.”173 Newspaper accounts
supplied additional details. For example, the Trump administration expanded the
zones designated as areas of “active hostilities” to include Somalia.174 With respect
to the substantive rules specifically, journalistic accounts suggest that the Trump
administration dispensed with the rule that a terrorist target must pose a continuing,
imminent threat to U.S. persons and interests and that there must be a near certainty
that the terrorist target is present—instead adopting a “reasonable certainty” test.175
165
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But the Trump administration appeared to retain other elements found in the PPG,
such as the preference for capture and the requirement that there must be “near
certainty” that civilians will not be harmed before lethal force may be used.176 With
respect to the procedural elements, the Trump administration reportedly permitted
decision-making to take place at lower levels of command.177 Indeed, at the time this
Article goes to press, the Trump administration policy was finally made public, and
it is now evident that the policy also gave discretion to descisionmakers to deviate
from the standard “where necessary.”178 The Biden administration has suspended
the Trump policy and is currently reviewing how to modify the policy again.179
The elements of the PPG, and to a lesser extent, the Trump administration’s
successor policy, exceed the requirements of IHL/LOAC and, I would argue, at least
move in the direction of IHRL. Both the substantive standards and the procedures
set forth in these policies contain elements that resemble components of the IHRL
framework for the use of lethal force. Although the terms used are not exactly the
same, the concepts are similar.
For example, under the PPG, U.S. authorities were required to determine that a
terrorist target poses a “continuing, imminent threat” to U.S. persons and interests
before approving the use of lethal force. This standard far exceeds the targeting
standards of IHL/LOAC outlined in Part I. Rather, it looks more like the standard
typically mandated by IHRL that authorities may not deploy lethal force except
when “strictly” or “absolutely necessary,” limiting the use of such force to
circumstances such as when harm is “imminent.” Similarly, the PPG’s preference
for capture mirrors IHRL’s rule that lethal force must be a last resort, with no other
reasonable alternatives (such as capture). In addition, the PPG resembles IHRL in
mandating that there must be “near certainty” civilians will not be harmed before
lethal action may be taken. The IHL/LOAC proportionality rule does not even come
close to dictating such certainty but rather accepts the grim reality that civilian
casualties are lawful within an armed conflict if expected casualties are
proportionate to expected military advantage. IHRL, by contrast, requires under
some formulations, “due regard” for harm to third parties, and in others, a degree of
certainty that third parties will not be injured.
The procedural aspects of the PPG also bear similarities to the obligations of
IHRL and far exceed any procedural rules found in IHL/LOAC. As discussed in Part
I, IHRL formulations of the right to life encompass obligations on the part of the
state to undertake certain procedures such as advance planning before conducting
operations that entail the use of lethal force. IHRL does not map out specific
procedures per se, but a lack of adequate planning could trigger a violation. Although
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IHL/LOAC might be said to impose some procedural requirements, such as warning
civilian populations before military operations where possible, these obligations are
less stringent and more flexible. The PPG’s rules about levels of authorization, and
even the existence of the PPG itself, could be seen to implement the kind of
procedural obligation that IHRL envisions.
The Trump administration’s successor policy, despite discarding some aspects
of the PPG, nonetheless retained elements that still exceed the requirements of
IHL/LOAC and move in the direction of IHRL. In particular, the requirement that
lethal force may only be used if there is a “near certainty” civilians will not be
harmed goes far beyond the IHL/LOAC proportionality rule. And although the
Trump administration’s successor policy reportedly dispensed with rules mandating
approval of operations by senior civilian officials and gave decisionmakers the
discretion to deviate from the standards “where necessary,” the existence of the
policy itself is more than IHL/LOAC would demand. As in the case of the PPG, the
successor policy might go some distance toward satisfying the kind of procedural
planning obligations imposed by IHRL.
It should be noted that the PPG could also be interpreted as incorporating some
elements of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the PPG’s requirement that U.S. officials
determine that the territorial state authorities are unwilling or unable to address the
particular threat resembles the emerging doctrine that the use of force by one state
in the territory of another in self-defense could be permissible if the territorial state
is unwilling or unable to address the threat. Also, the PPG’s requirement that there
must be a “continuing, imminent threat” to U.S. persons and interests could be
viewed as incorporating elements of the jus ad bellum self-defense doctrine (which
includes a showing of an armed attack or an imminent armed attack) in addition to
or in the alternative to an IHRL “imminence” rule for self-defense.
Thus, as a matter of policy, both the PPG and the Trump administration’s
successor policy can be seen to incorporate some elements of IHRL and the jus ad
bellum. To be sure, it is a little unclear precisely which legal categories the policies
are adopting. And the PPG (and presumably the Trump administration successor)
do not specifically acknowledge that they are incorporating legal categories at all.
But the bottom line is that the United States has adopted restrictive rules—both in
the PPG and in the Trump administration’s successor policy—that are more akin to
IHRL standards than to the IHL/LOAC standards that the United States continues to
insist are the appropriate legal rules in this context.
B. The PRB Framework
As in the case of targeting, the United States has embraced a war paradigm for
the detention of terrorism suspects captured outside the United States and held in
military detention, even far from conventional battlefields. Since 9-11, the United
States has held thousands of persons in military detention extraterritorially, not only
in Iraq and Afghanistan but also notably in Guantanamo Bay.180 Across multiple
180
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administrations, the United States has consistently clung to the view such
extraterritorial detainees are war detainees and that the international legal
requirements applicable to them are therefore those mandated by IHL/LOAC, rather
than the more restrictive rules of IHRL.181 Yet, as in the case of the PPG and its
successor targeting policy, the United States has as a matter of policy adopted
procedures and practices for these detainees that exceed the requirements of
IHL/LOAC as the United States interprets it, and move at least somewhat in the
direction of IHRL. The most significant of these policies is the periodic review board
procedure (PRBs) for Guantanamo detainees adopted in the Obama administration
and continued in the Trump and Biden administrations.182
The PRBs emerged in 2011 when the Obama administration issued an
Executive Order forming boards to assess the status of Guantanamo detainees who
had been designated for preventive detention under the laws of war or who had been
referred for criminal prosecution but had not yet been charged.183 The PRBs
provided enhanced protections for detainees compared to precursor procedures,
known as Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), initiated in the Bush
administration.184 Pursuant to the Order, the PRBs’ function was to evaluate whether
the continued detention of a covered individual was warranted in order “to protect
against a significant threat to the security of the United States.”185 Because Congress
has prohibited the transfer of any Guantamo detainees to the United States,186 the
only option for moving a detainee out of Guantanamo is transfer to another country.
In cases where the PRB concludes that continued detention is unnecessary, the
Secretaries of State and Defense are responsible for making vigorous efforts to
transfer such detainees outside the United States, consistent with national security
interests.187 Congress subsequently codified the PRBs as part of the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act, which mandates that the executive branch must make
PRB rules and procedures available to Congress.188
The procedures before the PRBs, set forth in the NDAA and U.S. executive
branch rules, consist of an initial review and subsequent periodic reviews as to
whether the continued detention of each individual is necessary to prevent a security
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risk.189 Each detainee, who is provided with a personal representative, has the
opportunity to participate in a hearing before the PRB.190 In addition, detainees may
hire lawyers to represent them at their own expense. At the hearing, the detainee and
his representative can challenge the government’s factual basis for ongoing
detention and introduce evidence.191 After the initial review, officials must conduct
a full review every three years, with interim reviews every six months.192
The boards are composed of senior civilian officials from the Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State, members of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, and officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.193 Each
board has access to all government information relevant to the detainee being
reviewed and considers this information alongside diplomatic considerations,
security assurances, the detainee’s mental and physical health, and any other
mitigating information.194 The board may not rely on any information obtained
through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.195 The recommendation
of the board is submitted to cabinet-level officials at the represented departments
and agencies, and these officials are allotted 30 days to object to the PRB’s
disposition of any given detainee.196 An objection triggers a review by a review
committee of these agency principals. Once the decision is made, it is published on
the review secretariat’s website.197
Despite statements by President Trump suggesting that he would radically
depart from the Obama administration approach to military detention at Guantanamo
and elsewhere,198 the Trump administration largely continued the procedures
established in the Obama administration to evaluate military detainees, including the
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PRBs.199 President Trump did state that he would keep the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility open—in marked contrast to President Obama’s efforts to close
the facility—and add to the detainee population there.200 Yet the Trump
administration did not transfer any new detainees to Guantanamo, and indeed
transferred one detainee out of the facility.201 An executive order issued fairly early
in the Trump administration explicitly provided for the continued operation of the
PRBs.202 To be sure, federal law required the administration to continue with the
PRBs because the elements of the PRBs were codified in the 2012 National Defense
Appropriation Act.203 But the order went further than the statute requires, stating that
such boards and their existing procedures (inherited from the Obama administration)
would be used “to determine whether continued law of war detention is necessary to
protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.”204 Secretary
of Defense James Mattis also issued implementing guidelines for the PRB
process.205 And in habeas proceedings initiated by Guantanamo detainees, Trump
administration lawyers referred to the PRB proceedings as evidence of fairness in
decision-making about ongoing detention.206 The Biden administration has
continued to follow PRB procedures.207
Like the PPG, the PRB process can be seen as a legalized policy that moves
somewhat in the direction of IHRL. The U.S. executive branch has never stated that
the PRBs are required as a matter of international law—either IHRL or IHL/LOAC.
Yet, the board procedures come closer to the kinds of due process requirements of
IHRL (and also the kind of procedures IHL/LOAC mandates for certain categories
of detainees in international armed conflicts) than the precursor CSRTs. As
compared to the CSRTs, the PRBs include enhanced procedural protections for the
individual detainees. Detainees have more opportunity to present and rebut evidence
199
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that forms the factual basis for their continued detention, and they are entitled to
personal representatives to assist them. Though comprised entirely of executive
branch officials and therefore not courts constituted within a separate branch of
government, the boards bear some hallmarks of independence. For example, they
are more independent than purely military tribunals or the precursor CSRT panels,
as members include career officials from multiple agencies. Moreover, the
establishment and continuation of the PRBs via executive orders and the codification
of key elements in U.S. legislation increases the transparency and rationality of
proceedings. Although the contents of many of the specific proceedings remain
classified, the legal framework for the proceedings and its rules are clear and open
to the public.
To be sure, PRB procedures still do not provide the kind of full-fledged judicial
proceedings that would be required under IHRL when state agents detain criminal
suspects in peacetime. Although the detainees have the benefit of assistance from a
personal representative and may hire lawyers at their own expense, they are not
entitled to legal representation without cost. The detainees have greater
opportunities to present and rebut evidence in the PRBs than in the earlier CSRTs,
but hearsay is still permitted, and they are not necessarily entitled to view all of the
evidence. And, of course, the PRBs are not independent courts.
Moreover, in practice, the PRBs have a mixed record. On the one hand, the
PRB reviews have concluded that many Guantanamo detainees were not a
continuing threat and therefore were “eligible for transfer” to their home countries
or third countries.208 But on the other hand, the PRB process has been slow, and the
outcome for the detainees approved for transfer remains uncertain. Although the
initial executive order specified that all initial reviews would commence no later
than one year from the date of the order, “the hearings did not begin until 2013, and
all initial hearings were not completed until September 2016.”209 Furthermore, even
detainees deemed eligible for transfer following PRB review may not leave
Guantanamo unless the United States makes arrangements with another country that
is willing and able to provide sufficient security assurances. The Obama
administration transferred 36 of 38 PRB-approved detainees from Guantanamo to
their home countries or third countries, but the others approved remained in
detention at the end of the administration.210 Overall, the Obama administration
transferred, repatriated, or resettled 197 Guantanamo detainees (some were
transferred pursuant to procedures that pre-dated the PRBs).211 The Trump
208
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administration transferred only one.212 At the time of writing this Article, the Biden
administration has deemed three additional detainees eligble for transfer through the
PRB process, and one has been transferred.213 Currently, 39 remain in detention, 27
of whom still have not been charged with a crime within the military conmmissions
system.214 Of those 27, ten have now been cleared for transfer if security conditions
permit, while 17 have been recommended for continued detention.215
Critics of the PRB process have suggested that, despite operating according to
the same administrative framework, the work of the PRBs under the Trump
administration was in practice deeply flawed.216 In particular, commentators have
cited long delays in the publication of PRB decisions as evidence of dysfunction and
potential interference by senior political officials.217 None of the PRB proceedings
during the Trump administration resulted in approval to transfer any additional
Guantanamo detainees.218 At least one commentator has argued that the Trump
administration turned the review boards into a “one-way ratchet for justifying
continued detention” and a “fig leaf.”219 In the Biden administration, the PRBs have
found new life, yielding decisions declaring more detainees eligible for transfer.220
Despite their significant flaws, the boards nonetheless represent a middle
ground between the kind of unchecked military detention established in the George
W. Bush administration and the full-fledged judicial process that would be required
for detainees in the civilian justice system. As such, they provide an example of the
kind of policies that serve a variety of functions discussed below—bridging
differences with U.S. allies and internal critics who take a more constrained view of
the war paradigm for extraterritorial counterterrorism.
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C. Legalistic Nature of Policies
The two policies discussed here—the PPG and its Trump administration
successor targeting policy, as well as the PRB procedures—are distinctive in an
important respect: they are what we might call “legalistic.” Both in substance and in
the procedures they set forth, each of the policies contains legalistic categories.
Moreover, each demands a role for lawyers, even if that role is implicit. To
implement the policies, agency and military officials must, as a practical matter,
obtain advice from executive branch lawyers, both civilian and military.
With respect to substance, each of the policies includes categories that, if not
directly imported from legal frameworks, bear at least some resemblance to such
categories. For example, in the case of the PPG, the concept of “continuing,
imminent threat” has analogs in both IHRL and the law of self-defense. And the
term “near certainty” is the kind of term that is relevant in a variety of legal analyses.
Similarly, the PRB procedures require officials to evaluate whether a detainee poses
a “continuing threat”—another term that could easily be lifted from other legal
frameworks. And these policies are, in any event, now codified as law at the
domestic level even if not recognized as required by international law.
These policies are also legalistic in the procedures they establish. The PPG
requires government officials at certain levels to assess operations.221 That
requirement implies some type of formalized bureaucratic process. Much less is
known about the details of the Trump administration successor targeting policy,
though journalistic accounts suggest that it allowed decisions to be made by lowerlevel officials.222 It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that even there, some
type of formalized internal bureaucratic process goverened application of the rules
set forth in the policy. The PRB policy is even more legalistic in the procedures it
creates: effectively, the policy establishes a kind of administrative tribunal and
review process.223
All of these policies imply a role for executive branch lawyers, even if that role
is not necessarily explicit. Lawyers appear to be necessary to interpret the terms of
the targeting policy as it is applied. And executive branch lawyers are crucial to
evaluating the terms of the PRB policy. In other words, lawyers’ judgments and
recommendations are essential to implement these policies just as they are to
evaluate the legality of operations under international law. In a sense, the policies
establish lawyers as guardians of the policy implementation process itself. Thus,
although the United States has never acknowledged that these policies are required
by international law, they establish an institutional role for lawyers.
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III. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW PARADIGMS AND THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE POLICY APPROACH
By implementing terrorism targeting and detention policies, the United States
has moved in the direction of IHRL even as it has rejected the formal legal
constraints of this body of law. Why has it done so? The context in which these
policies have emerged strongly suggests that interoperability—the ability to work
with partners who follow IHRL—is a significant factor. Specifically, the multilateral
dimension of counterterrorism operations requires the United States to take account
of other countries’ view of the law, leading to a ratcheting up in standards. Whether
they provide intelligence to the United States or offer consent to U.S. operations on
their territory, partner states that follow IHRL exert pressure on the United States to
observe human rights principles.
Further, it is significant that when the United States adopts these policies, they
acquire a “legalistic” valence that appears to exert a kind of practical binding force
through internal organizational culture and practice. Lawyers help write the policies,
using legal terms that in turn require legal analysis. As a consequence, the process
of internally approving military operations requires evaluation of these policies in
the same manner as if they were international legal standards. The durability of these
policies may stem, in part, from the way they become embedded in the national
security bureaucracy.224 As in the case of the interoperability benefits, the
organizational dimension of these policies could be tested in future empirical work.
The story of these policies, therefore, contributes an important new perspective
to the long-running international law compliance debate. What we see is that even
when international law does not technically exert binding force, the need to apply
its paradigms can end up making a real (and possibly lasting) difference. But that
then raises the question: is it actually better for these international human rights
norms to be effectuated through discretionary national security policymaking? Or
would it have been preferable for the Obama administration to have produced a
formal legal determination that counterterrorism operations outside the hot
battlefield are governed by international human rights law? Should the new Biden
administration continue the policy approach or articulate a broader role for IHRL?
In other words, what are the pros and cons of seeking international law compliance
or addressing international law’s ambiguities through policy rather than law?
The advantages and disadvantages, of course, vary considerably depending on
one’s position and perspective. For example, an advantage for the U.S. executive
branch might be viewed as a disadvantage from the perspective of non-governmental
organizations championing the cause of human rights. In addition, the governments
of different countries may perceive the advantages and disadvantages in an
altogether different light. What is clear, however, is that the adoption of legalized
224
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policies such as the PPG and the PRBs has consequences. Here, I will map them out
from two somewhat contrasting perspectives: the U.S. executive branch and the
human rights community. I recognize that neither perspective is itself monolithic,
but it is helpful to understand how legalistic policies may look from these two
vantage points.
A. U.S. Executive Branch—Advantages of Policy Approaches
From the perspective of U.S. executive branch officials, it may be advantageous
to embrace a legal paradigm that sets fewer minimum requirements and then adopt
legalistic policies such as the PPG and the PRBs that exceed these minimum legal
requirements. In the face of ambiguity about the scope of international law and the
choice of the appropriate legal paradigm or paradigms, this approach offers an
attractive path forward for a variety of reasons. Indeed, it may often be easier for
executive branch officials to adopt policies than to clarify the scope of the law or
choose the more demanding legal paradigm.
1. Policy Is Flexible
To begin with, policy is flexible. When executive branch officials assert only a
minimalist view of legal requirements but then exceed those requirements as a
matter of policy, officials maintain room to maneuver. Such an approach, therefore,
may be more pragmatic; it can be fine-tuned and calibrated to specific
circumstances, and it preserves discretion for the executive branch.
This flexibility was likely an important consideration in adopting the PPG and
the PRBs. The framework of IHRL, as applied to targeting and detaining terrorists
extraterritorially, might seem to be overly formalist and impractical in many
circumstances. Watkin sums up this position quite forcefully, observing that the
strictures of a purist or strict IHRL approach to counterterrorism present the spectre
of a “security black hole.”225 If governments must satisfy all the requirements of
IHRL, including showing in virtually every circumstance that a threat is imminent
before using lethal force, it may be difficult to act quickly enough to effectively
counter that threat. The more minimalist rules of IHL/LOAC do not require strict
necessity or imminence assessments before lethal force may be used. A state that
embraces policies such as the PPG or PRB procedures retains the discretion to
choose standards that resemble those of IHRL when it is feasible to do so. But
because the policy does not impose legal restraints at the international level, a state
that has adopted such a policy may also deviate from the standards in the policy if
circumstances dictate. The state thus preserves scope for a range of action while still
emphasizing its commitment to follow international law.
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2. Policy Can Bridge Gaps in Legal Interpretation Among States, IOs, and NGOs
A policy approach can also serve as a bridge between different interpretations
of international law held by different states, as well as among states, international
organizations (IOs) and NGOs. When one state, such as the United States, believes
that IHL/LOAC governs extraterritorial counterterrorism operations even outside
traditional battlefields, and another asserts that the more demanding law of
international human rights applies, a policy that incorporates elements of IHRL can
minimize the impact of these contrasting views. If the state that adheres to the more
permissive rules of IHL/LOAC implements practices that exceed those minimum
rules, the practical impact of this state’s contrasting legal approach will diminish.
The conflict over legal paradigms thus may virtually disappear as a practical matter,
at least at the operational level.
One could make the case that the PPG and the PRBs have served this type of
role. As discussed above, the PPG brought the United States closer—at least in
practice—to the approach of many allies, IOs, and civil society groups that take a
more constrained view of the scope of armed conflicts with terrorist groups. The
standards for direct action specified in the PPG, including for targeted killing and
capture, approximate the rules of IHRL outside areas designated as “areas of active
hostilities.” To be sure, these standards do not fully equal the stringent requirements
of IHRL, and the terms of each do not fully map onto one another. And, furthermore,
the Trump administration’s successor policy moved back in the other direction,
expanding the gap in approaches. But nonetheless, this policy still exceeded the
minimum requirements of IHL/LOAC and thus came closer to an IHRL framework
than a purely minimalist application of IHL/LOAC. Even under the Trump
administration approach, outside areas of active hostilities the U.S. military
reportedly still could not use lethal force unless there was a near certainty that
civilians will not be killed.226 In the targeting context, such policies also provided an
opportunity to implement standards that approximated jus ad bellum elements that
many allies, IOs, and NGOs embraced given their more limited view of the scope of
existing armed conflict. Thus, even though U.S. allies (and IOs and NGOs) might
still have disagreed with the U.S. view of the appropriate legal paradigm for such
operations, there were likely fewer practical disagreements with regard to the
specific actions the United States actually undertook during counterterrorism
operations.
Similarly, the PRBs have brought the United States a few steps closer to a
human rights paradigm for the detention of terrorism suspects. Although the
procedures do not fully embody human rights due process protections, they do
provide more protections for detainees in the form of regularized administrative
proceedings.
The PPG, and to a slightly lesser extent, the Trump administration’s successor
policy, along with the PRB procedures, also potentially reduce conflicts with the
territorial states where the United States is taking direct action. By requiring U.S.
226
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actors to ensure there is a near certainty that civilians will not be harmed during a
direct action, the PPG and the Trump administration policy both minimize the extent
to which host states may object to such action on their territory. And the operation
of the PRBs potentially blunts criticisms of human-rights oriented U.S. allies
regarding the Guantanamo detainees.
By bridging these types of differences among states, IOs, and NGOs, legalized
policies such as the PPG and the PRBs can reduce interoperability concerns of
multilateral operations. Such interoperability needs could arise when, for example,
U.S. allies must consider whether to share intelligence that could be used in a U.S.
targeting or detention operation. Indeed, the 2016 Frameworks Report
acknowledges that differences in legal interpretation among states can bring
challenges to such operations.227 The report notes that the U.S. regularly consults
with allies to find pragmatic solutions in such situations—to find a way to work
together.228 The PPG and the Trump administration’s successor policy (and any
replacement policy crafted by the Biden administration), as well as the existence of
the PRB procedures, can help with this effort.
3. Policy Provides a Path to Resolve Differences of Legal Interpretation
Within a Government
A legalistic policy also has the potential to bridge differences within a
government. Executive branch officials may themselves disagree about the
applicable legal framework for a particular operation or type of operation. When
such disputes arise, a legalistic policy can smooth over such differences. It may be
easier in many cases to achieve consensus to adopt such a policy than to resolve the
dispute with a definitive decision about what legal regime applies.
The PPG and the PRB procedures may be examples of this kind of bridge. The
precise history of the PPG and the PRB procedures is not known due to the
sensitivity of the national security context in which they arose. Accounts now public
of debates within the Obama administration at the time, however, indicate that top
administration lawyers were locked in heated discussions regarding contrasting
paradigms under international law and the use of force, as well as the interpretation
of the rules within those paradigms.229
Against the backdrop of hard-fought contests over legal meaning, a policy
approach such as the PPG or the PRB procedures would certainly seem attractive.
Rather than hashing out freighted differences over legal restrictions on U.S. action,
executive branch officials crafting policy solutions can avoid such differences
altogether. The choice of a legal paradigm and an explicit public acknowledgment
of the applicability of that paradigm, particularly a restrictive one, has enormous
consequences for a state that hews faithfully to its international legal commitments.
Policies such as the PPG and the PRB procedures circumvent this issue while
227
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advancing the underlying values of the human rights paradigm and addressing the
concerns of IOs and NGOS that adopt a more human rights oriented stance. In the
targeting context, these policies also provide an opportunity to implement standards
that approximate jus ad bellum elements that many of these entities embrace given
their more limited conception of the scope of existing armed conflict. For executive
branch officials wary of the human rights paradigm, the policy preserves the legal
discretion of the United States. For executive branch officials who believe the human
rights principles are important, the policy enables them to implement those
principles in a pragmatic way. In this sense, such a policy is a win-win.
B. U.S. Executive Branch—Disadvantages of Policy Approaches
For the reasons described above, policies such as the PPG and the PRB
procedures bring distinct advantages for the executive branch. But even from a
purely executive branch perspective, such policies carry some disadvantages as well.
Indeed, some of the benefits discussed above have as their flip side some negative
consequences.
1. Policy Approaches Can Impede the Resolution of Legal Differences Among
States and the Development of the Law
Even as they serve a bridging function among states, policy approaches may
slow or impede the resolution of legal differences among such states. Such policies,
to some extent, mask the legal dimensions of a problem and can interfere with the
development of the law. For example, a state that only chooses to bind itself as a
matter of policy might still want other states to similarly bind themselves, but it loses
its ability to insist on such compliance if the issue is only treated as a matter of
policy, not law. To the extent that the United States is essentially abiding by IHRL
rules in extraterritorial counterterrorism operations but not committing to them as
legally binding, a policy approach reduces the opportunity for the United States to
encourage states who do not follow such principles to embrace a human rights
approach. Abiding by IHRL as a matter of law in more extraterritorial
counterterrorism contexts also would give the United States opportunities to shape
how that body of law is applied in such settings and engage with institutions that,
with or without U.S. participation, seek to apply IHRL to U.S. activities abroad.
Therefore, it may be in the state’s interest to advance a view of the law that would
bind others to standards the state itself is following.
In addition, the adoption of a policy impedes the development of clear legal
rules regarding state obligations under customary international law, which requires
both state practice and a sense of legal obligation.230 In order for a state to embrace
a norm as customary international law, it must, therefore, both demonstrate a general
practice of following the norm and also indicate that it is following the norm because
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it must do so—out of a sense of obligation.231 Scholars and policymakers disagree
about what actions constitute sufficient state practice to amount to customary
international law.232 There is also a robust debate about the type of evidence that
would establish that a state is acting out of a sense of legal obligation.233 But
regardless of these debates, policies such as the PPG and the PRB, even if they count
as state practice, are not likely to serve as evidence that a state is acting out of a
sense of legal obligation at the international level—precisely because they are
policies and not law. Therefore, the embrace of such policies would not support the
development of customary international law.
The PPG and the PRB procedures offer examples of policies that, while
potentially easing interoperability concerns among states with different legal views,
mask the legal dimensions of the problem and potentially slow the development of
customary international law. The PPG (and to a lesser degree the Trump
administration’s successor policy), along with the PRB procedures, put the United
States more on the same page—as a matter of practice—as those states that adopt a
law-enforcement approach to extraterritorial counterterrorism operations. But in
doing so, those policies obscure the differences among states about the appropriate
international law paradigm that governs the extraterritorial use of force or detention
with regard to such operations. The policies themselves do not refer to specific legal
categories. Although the standards in the PPG and the PRB procedures resemble the
categories of IHRL, these standards do not match these categories exactly. Indeed,
the policies do not refer to IHRL at all. Thus, the policies do not, in any sense,
explicitly acknowledge the conflict in legal terms. Accordingly, with respect to
direct extraterritorial action outside of “hot” battlefields and extraterritorial military
detention, the policies do nothing to advance greater harmonization of divergent
legal perspectives—either in the direction of the more restrictive IHRL or the more
minimalist IHL/LOAC approach.
Because the United States has adopted the PPG and PRB as a matter of policy
at the international level—not as actions taken due to a sense of legal obligation,
neither policy contributes to the development of customary international law. One
might argue that, to the extent that the policy is law at the domestic level, actions
taken pursuant to the PPG and the PRB procedures should count as actions taken
pursuant to a sense of legal obligation. Yet, the notion that domestic legal obligations
of this nature could satisfy the opinion juris element of customary international law
is not universally accepted. Thus, operations conducted within the framework of the
PPG or the PRB procedures would not clearly establish customary international law.
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2. Policy Can Impede the Resolution of Different Legal Interpretations
Within a Government
As discussed above, policy approaches can help paper over differences in legal
interpretation internally within a state. That also means, however, that the adoption
of such policies can effectively block efforts to actually resolve those differences of
legal interpretation. Policy allows for a pragmatic path forward without forcing a
decision to be made on the underlying legal question. But as a consequence, the
policy decision can lead to long-term inconsistency because it does not bind future
administrations in the same way that legal interpretations do. And though, of course,
even a legal interpretation can be revisited by a future administration, the process
for doing so is far more difficult than simply changing a policy.
In the case of the PPG and the PRB procedures, the policy approach has led to
just this sort of malleability. It did not resolve what may have been internal
differences in legal views about direct extraterritorial action against terrorists. For
example, as discussed above, one of the first initiatives the Trump administration
reportedly took was to revise the PPG, even as it retained some of the policy’s
elements.234 Future administrations could always make further changes to the policy,
as the Biden administration is reportedly now considering at the time this Article
goes to press.
3. The Adoption of Policies Can Be Misconstrued as the Development
of Customary International Law
Finally, the implementation of a legalistic policy may spark confusion about
whether the policy is evidence of customary international law. As discussed above,
the adoption of a policy should not establish customary international law because
the states that embrace such policies are not doing so out of a sense of legal
obligation. Nonetheless, a variety of actors in the international community—
including some states, IOs, or NGOs—may draw attention to a policy and assert that
it is, in fact, evidence of customary international law. Even if the state adopting the
policy would stand on strong legal ground in rejecting such assertions, these types
of statements require executive branch time and attention. From an executive branch
perspective, legalistic policies, therefore, carry the risk that other entities will
misconstrue the legal dimension of state actions according to the policies.
This risk has arguably been borne out to some degree with respect to the PPG
and the PRB procedures. Some entities have suggested that the PPG and the PRB
procedures reflect legal, rather than policy, rules.235 To be sure, executive branch
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officials could mitigate this risk by repeatedly and transparently asserting that it is
acting pursuant to policy. Indeed, if every time states adopt such policies, an effort
is made to infer that customary international law has been created, then states might
stop adopting more restrictive policies altogether and might instead retreat to a more
minimalist approach.
C. The Human Rights Community
The advantages and disadvantages of legalistic policies depend in part on
perspective. The executive branch perspective discussed above is likely to differ
from perspectives within the human rights community. To be sure, neither the U.S.
executive branch nor the human rights community is uniform. In particular, the
human rights community is quite diverse, and it includes a variety of actors and
entities from around the world. But in general, the concerns of the executive branch
will not match those in the human rights community.
1. Advantages of Policy Approach
From a human rights perspective, government adoption of more human rights
protective policies is a mixed bag. On the one hand, such policies have the practical
impact of making the state more compliant with human rights norms in its day-today counterterrorism operations. This is a big plus from a human rights perspective,
and it is possible that if the human rights community had pushed for a full-throated
legal embrace of IHRL in the extraterritorial counterterrorism context, even during
the Obama administration, the effort would have failed. Thus, one might see the
adoption of legalistic policies as an important, pragmatic human rights victory with
very real positive consequences on the ground. Moreover, even though
administrations can, in theory, change such policies, they are remarkably durable in
practice.
In the case of the PPG and the PRB procedures, the human-rights protecting
standards it imposed were a real win for the human rights community. Under the
PPG, as a matter of policy, the United States agreed to adhere to human rights values
in the use of force extraterritorially. Under the PRBs, the United States has provided
more procedural protections for Guantanamo detainees. Furthermore, it is
significant that key aspects of these policies persisted even in the Trump
administration.236 These policies are, therefore, evidence that published policy
decisions can be sticky and lead to path dependence, even if not to the same extent
as legal determinations.
.cc/NSJ6-RATN] (noting that “[t]he President should formalize safeguards that would bring
our country’s use of force into compliance with international law, including by clearly
differentiating between the rules that apply to the use of force in war and the rules that govern
the use of lethal force in all other circumstances”) (internal quotations omitted).
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2. Disadvantages of Policy Approach
On the other hand, as discussed above, the adoption of legalistic policies can
slow the development of the law. Thus, if a state opts to make policy rather than
embrace a human rights-oriented view of the law, human rights groups may view
this choice as a cop-out. Furthermore, the secrecy around the implementation of
these policies can lead to self-serving interpretations by executive branch officials
that water down their terms.237 And, as previously noted, a policy is more vulnerable
to subsequent reinterpretation or case-by-case backsliding than a legal interpretation
would be.
With respect to both the PPG and the PRBs, a fair case can be made that the
Obama administration missed an opportunity to articulate a more human rightsoriented approach to counterterrorism. By adopting legalistic policies, it failed to
articulate legal limitations beyond the minimum rules of IHL/LOAC with respect to
extraterritorial counterterrorism operations outside of armed conflict. This failure
made it easier for the subsequent administration to reverse course. Of course, from
a human rights perspective, adoption of the policies was still far preferable to a
minimalist IHL/LOAC legal interpretation, so adoption of a potentially sticky policy
was certainly better than no human rights regarding action at all. Nonetheless, this
is an important issue for the human rights community to consider in engaging with
the human rights-oriented Biden administration: to what extent should the human
rights community advocate for the executive branch to embrace a more expansive
role for IHRL and a more confined role for IHL/LOAC in extraterritorial counterterrorism operations outside traditional battlefields.
D. Other Considerations: The Role for Lawyers
Policy presents one final issue worth noting. From a human rights perspective,
one might be worried that rules adopted as a matter of policy rather than legal
obligation might diminish the role of lawyers in decision-making regarding
counterterrorism operations. In general, decreasing the role of lawyers might give
military officers a freer hand to make determinations that are less likely to take
human rights into account. However, because the policies I have described are
sufficiently legalistic, they actually still require a role for lawyers in interpreting
them. Thus, it is not clear that the role of lawyers actually diminishes. Indeed, it may
be that lawyers are more necessary because the interaction of the underlying
IHL/LOAC and the policy may actually make the rules more complicated to parse.
Of course, one could also view the role of lawyers as a problem because legal vetting
can delay the deployment of military operations or tie the military’s hands.
In the case of the PPG and most likely its successor Trump administration
policy, along with the PRB procedures, both military and civilian lawyers had to
engage at a variety of levels to assess the implementation of the policy. And, as I
have argued elsewhere, military lawyers often play a very real constraining role in
237
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military operations.238 On the other hand, the role of lawyers imposes a greater
complexity on operations and could, in theory, slow them down. Whether that is
good or bad depends on whether you focus on the potential human rights value in
increased deliberation or whether you think military operations will be unnecessarily
delayed by needless red tape.
CONCLUSION
The story of the PPG and the PRB procedures highlights that one of the critical
frontiers in thinking about international law compliance is the boundary between
law and policy in the domain of extraterritorial counterterrorism operations.
Although scholars and human rights observers who work in this domain tend to
focus on legal rules, it turns out that executive branch policies can be a crucial aspect
of compliance with the values underlying international legal regimes. Even if they
do not accept certain international legal regimes as binding at the international level,
governments may nonetheless translate and embed international law paradigms
within such policies.
And such policies may have important advantages, both for governments that
seek consensus with other countries and within their own national security
bureaucracy, as well as for human rights advocates who seek greater practical human
rights compliance on a day-to-day level. Indeed, governments may be more willing
to adopt robust human rights policies for many of their activities if they do not feel
that doing so will bind them in all circumstances as a matter of law. On the other
hand, when governments adopt policies, they miss important opportunities to clarify
international law and incorporate core legal standards more forcefully into their
military operations.
Thus, the decision of whether to adopt policies rather than legal rules is a key
issue both for further study and practical deliberation, particularly as the new Biden
administration considers whether to revise existing policies. For example, in revising
these policies, the Biden administration, which has expressed a strong commitment
to ending so-called “forever wars” and to protecting human rights, may now wish to
consider articulating a more limited scope for the armed conflict paradigm and a
broader role for IHRL as a matter of law rather than policy. At the same time, to the
extent that ambiguities remain regarding the content and reach of extraterritorial
IHRL obligations in a variety of contexts, policy may still provide a pragmatic path
forward in a variety of contexts. A narrower conception of armed conflict zones and
the accompanying legal paradigm will also put greater pressure on interpretations of
ad bellum rules, which in turn could spark a need for policies to address lingering
differences in interpretation among allies and others in this area as well. At a
minimum, the advantages and disadvantages of policies versus legal interpretations
are a fruitful area for continued investigation and debate. Comparative analysis may
also reveal differences in decision-making processes in this area from country to
country. And scholars of the sociology of institutions may provide insights regarding
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the impact of lawyers in interpreting these legalistic policies within governmental
bureaucracies. Finally, it will be important to see the extent to which voluntary
policies harden into customary law over time.
In any event, given that global counterterrorism operations are likely to
continue for the foreseeable future, those interested in charting the path of
international law compliance must pay attention not only to the formal categories of
international law but also to the way different governments finesse those categories
through the use of policy. Indeed, sometimes those policies may actually be more
important in determining actual state practice on the ground than the official
international law doctrines. Further, as a normative matter, scholars, government
officials, NGOs, and others must consider the advantages and disadvantages of a
policy-oriented approach to international law compliance.

